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Having historically received very little foreign direct investment, Japan has experienced a 
substantial increase in such inflows in recent years. This paper analyzes the impact of the 
growing presence of foreign firms on the Japanese economy through detailed case studies on 
the automobile, finance, and health care industries. The wholesale & retail and the 
telecommunications sector are also briefly examined. The case studies show that in the sectors 
considered, foreign firms in one way or another are contributing to a greater degree of 
competition, are exposing domestic firms to global best practice, and are increasing the range 
of products and services available in Japan. In many of the sectors, they are also contributing 
to changes in industry structure and employment practices. The case studies thus illustrate that 
foreign direct investment – even at its present levels, which, although large by Japanese 
standards, are still low in international comparison – can be an important catalyst for change 
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In recent years, Japan has experience what by its own historical standards amounts to a 
veritable boom in inward foreign direct investment (FDI). From 1998 to 2002 alone, 
investment receipts eclipsed the total for the entire post-war period,
1 and although off their 
record highs, inflows continue at levels well above those witnessed during the 1990s.
2 What is 
more, there is mounting evidence that the presence of foreign companies in Japan is 
increasingly making a difference to the economy, at least in a number of select industries.  
 
Yet, although FDI has been possible in most sectors for decades,
3 the role that foreign 
companies are playing in the Japanese economy has to date received little research interest.
4 
The large majority of studies, instead, has focused on trying to explain why FDI in Japan has 
been so low and has rarely looked beyond this.
5 While such neglect may be understandable in 
the context of the 1980s and even the 1990s, when inward FDI was indeed miniscule, this is 
no longer the case today. For example, following the surge in FDI into Japan, foreign-owned 
firms now account for more than 10 percent of employment in industries as diverse as drugs 
& medicine, chemicals, electrical machinery, motor vehicles & parts, miscellaneous transport 
equipment, financial intermediary services, and insurance (see Table 1 below for details). 
What is more, even in sectors where foreign firms continue to make up only a relatively small 
proportion of economic activity, they can have a significant impact in their industries and 
beyond – for example, through the products, management skills, and business models they 
introduce and the competitive pressure they exert.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate this impact in greater detail through a series of case 
studies of different sectors of the economy. In particular, the aim is to show how foreign 
companies are contributing to changes in the “landscape” of their respective industries. 
Multinational companies investing in a foreign country do so on the strength of their 
intangible assets, such as managerial skills, accumulated know-how, intellectual property, 
business models, brand names, etc., and, by deploying these assets in an acquired company or 
a newly-established entity, potentially introduce novel business practices and products and 
change the competitive parameters of their industry.  
 
The approach chosen in this study is to examine the various ways in which foreign 
multinational have done just that. To this end, the individual case studies examine the 
particular structure of an industry, the regulatory framework (where this has played a role in 
shaping the industry) and recent changes therein relevant for foreign direct investment. They 
then consider the role of foreign direct investment in the sector, hone in on prominent cases of 
                                                 
1 Calculated on a notification basis. 
2 For a detailed description and analysis of recent trends in inward FDI in Japan, see Paprzycki (2004). 
3 For a historical overview of foreign direct investment in Japan and FDI regulations, see Paprzycki and Fukao 
(2005). 
4 Probably the only in-depth analysis of the role of foreign companies in Japan is the excellent historical 
overview provided by Mason (1992), which, however, ends in 1980. 
5 Examples are Lawrence (1993), Weinstein (1997) and the various chapters in Yoshitomi and Graham (1996).  
  2FDI, and show how the presence of foreign multinationals in one way or another has affected 
domestic firms or the industry as a whole.  
 
Sectors examined in detail include the automobile industry, banking and insurance, and the 
health care sector (pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and health care services). Brief 
consideration will also be given to the wholesale & retail sector and telecommunications. As 
this list indicates, the scope of sectors covered is quite broad, ranging from manufacturing to 
services and from industries wide-open to foreign direct investment to those in which 
government regulations in effect continue to make FDI impossible. The analysis thus covers a 
fairly representative cross-section of Japanese industry. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the automobile industry, 
focusing in particular on Renault’s acquisition of Nissan and the growing presence of foreign 
suppliers in Japan. Section 3 turns to the financial sector, examining in detail the areas of 
investment banking, retail banking and insurance. Section 4 discusses the health care industry, 
concentrating on the pharmaceutical industry and the medical devices industry, but also 
considering health care services, a sector in which foreign direct investment remains 
impossible as a result of entry regulations on corporate providers. Section 5 then presents a 
brief examination of two further sectors – wholesale & retail and telecommunications – which  
have attracted substantial amounts of FDI, but which cannot be considered in detail here. 
Section 6, finally, provides a synthesis of the individual case studies and concludes.  
 
 
2. Automobile industry 
 
There is probably not a more suitable industry with which to begin the sectoral analysis of 
foreign direct investment in Japan than the auto industry. This is by far the country’s most 
internationalized industry: motor vehicles and parts account for a large share of all Japanese 
merchandise exports, and overseas production by the car industry is far ahead of that of any 
other Japanese industry.
6 Conversely, foreigners have been able to invest in the sector for 
decades, and General Motors (GM) and Ford acquired substantial stakes in Japanese auto 
makers in the early and late 1970s, respectively. As a result, even before the wave of FDI in 
the late 1990s, the auto industry was already the sector in Japan with the highest share of 
employment by foreign-owned companies (Table 1).  
 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
Yet, at the same time, even this relatively internationalized sector has remained essentially 
Japanese. Although foreign companies have acquired controlling stakes in a number of 
Japanese automakers, no wholly foreign-owned manufacturer actually produces cars in 
Japan;
7 foreign parts makers have only recently begun to penetrate the market; and foreign 
                                                 
6 In 2004, motor vehicles and parts exports made up 19.3 percent of Japan’s merchandise exports. The overseas 
production ratio of the Japanese car industry reached 32.6 percent in 2003, followed by the electronics industry 
with an overseas production ratio of 23.4 percent (Overseas production ratios from: Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa, Dai-34-kai (2003) [The 34
th Survey of Overseas Business 
Activities]. Online: <http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/downloadfiles/h2c402gj.pdf> (accessed 26 January, 2006). 
7 For this reason, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) has no foreign members, since a 
prerequisite for membership is to have manufacturing operations in Japan.  
  3brands continue to be relatively exotic. Though fiercely competitive, the Japanese market has 
been and continues to be dominated by domestic car makers. Imports of foreign cars account 
for less than 5 percent of total domestic sales. Compare this with the situation in Europe or the 
United States, where both imports and local production by wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries 
have long commanded considerable market shares. In Europe, for example, non-European 
makers alone accounted for about 39 percent of new car registrations in 2004.
8  
 
What is more, until recently, foreign participation in Japanese car makers has had little impact 
on the way the Japanese car industry operates. Despite substantial shareholdings by GM and 
Ford, the “Suzuki production system” or the “Mazda production system” have not been very 
different from the famous “Toyota production system” characterized not only by just-in-time 
production and lean manufacturing (now copied by most Western competitors), but also by a 
number of other Japanese business practices, such as close and long-term ties with dedicated 
(Japanese) suppliers, lifetime employment, and the reluctance to close factories in difficult 
times.
9 Thus, though the car industry appears relatively internationalized by Japanese 
standards, in comparison with other countries it still remains very much a home-grown affair. 
 
Nevertheless, the Japanese car industry today looks quite different from a decade ago as a 
number of international and domestic factors paved the way for foreign companies to gain a 
greater foothold in the Japanese market. On the international side, factors include the 
resurgence of volume producers in Europe and the U.S. during the 1990s as the former 
managed to strengthen brand images and the latter achieved quality improvements that 
diminished the competitive advantage of Japanese carmakers. At the same time, the 1990s 
where a period of global industry consolidation as carmakers entered vertical and horizontal 
alliances for the complementation of vehicle types and marketing areas.
10 All the while, 
global capacity was growing and Japanese manufacturers were not always well positioned to 
react to shifts in consumer tastes (such as the growing popularity of light trucks in the United 
States). Factors on the domestic side include the prolonged malaise of the Japanese economy 
and the maturation of the Japanese car market – annual car sales in Japan dropped from a peak 
of 5.1 million units in 1990 to a trough of 4.1 million in 1998 – as well as difficulties at some 
companies to adapt to the new environment.
11 International and domestic factors combined to 
erode the competitiveness of Japanese carmakers and meant that the industry consolidation 
that was sweeping the globe eventually also reached Japan.  
 
By far the most conspicuous cases were the acquisition of a controlling interest in Nissan by 
the much smaller French rival Renault and the tie-up between DaimlerChrysler and 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC), which made headlines worldwide. But, as shown in 
Table 2, there were also a number of other, less conspicuous deals involving car assemblers. 
General Motors progressively increased its stakes in Suzuki and Fuji Heavy (Subaru) to 20 
percent each, while Ford increased its holdings in Mazda to 33.4 percent, the ownership share 
required to gain a measure of management control. Meanwhile, in an entirely domestic tie-up, 
                                                 
8 This figure counts the European sales of Japanese and Korean makers and of the two core brands of the 
American auto giants GM (Opel/Vauxhaul) and Ford. Source: European Automobile Manufacturers Association. 
9 However, it should be noted that not all car manufacturers have used this “Japanese” production system with 
equal success. Research by Ito (2004) and Ito and Fukao (2001) indicates that some assemblers were much better 
than others at squeezing cost reductions out of their suppliers during the early 1990s. Although information for 
individual companies is not available, it seems almost certain that Toyota was much more successful at this than 
other firms such as, for example, Nissan.  
10 Development Bank of Japan (2000). 
11 Car sales have recovered somewhat from the low in 1998, reaching 4.8 million units in 2004. Figures from 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. Online: <http://www.jama.org/statistics/motorvehicle/sales/ 
mv_sales_year.htm> (accessed 9 February, 2006).  
  4Toyota boosted its investment in Daihatsu to 51 percent. What is more, foreign investment in 
the sector has not been confined to final assemblers as foreign parts suppliers have also 
increased their presence in Japan. Examples include Bosch (Germany), Valeo (France), 
Autoliv (Sweden), and Mahle (Germany), which all have acquired stakes in Japanese parts 
suppliers in recent years.  
 
 





Case study: The Renault-Nissan alliance 
 
Before examining changes in the Japanese car industry more generally, it is useful to have a 
closer look at the alliance between Renault and Nissan. Not only has this been the foreign 
investment in Japan that has received by far the most attention, it is also the one that has 
probably had the greatest impact on the Japanese car industry and beyond.  
 
Prior to the alliance with Renault, Nissan was a company in long-term decline: the Japanese 
car maker’s share both of the domestic and the global market were dropping, production 
volumes were falling, and the company was on the verge of bankruptcy, having registered 
losses in six of the seven years between 1992 and 1999, including the record loss of almost 
¥700 billion in 1999. The desperate state meant that the new management team from Renault 
led by Carlos Ghosn had considerable leeway to undertake drastic restructuring measures.  
 
The most publicized and controversial among these was the reduction of excess capacity by 
closing five factories in Japan and cutting the global workforce by 21,000, with 16,000 jobs 
axed in Japan. Similarly controversial was the dissolution of Nissan’s keiretsu, i.e. the sale of 
many of the company’s non-strategic assets, including stakes in the large majority of its more 
than 1,100 suppliers. This step went hand-in-hand with a streamlining of supplies. Whereas 
Nissan’s purchases of parts and materials had previously been organized by country or region, 
they were now to be organized on a global scale and combined with those of Renault trough 
the newly established Renault Nissan Purchasing Organization. Internal comparisons between 
Renault’s and Nissan’s purchasing costs had revealed that the latter was paying a substantial 
premium on identical parts and components, and using common purchasing represented one 
way in which it was possible to lower costs. Another was the reduction in the number of 
suppliers for parts and materials to 600, allowing those suppliers that continued to do business 
with Nissan to enjoy economies of scale. 
 
A further area in which operations were streamlined and global best practice was introduced 
is Nissan’s financial operations. Nissan had no chief financial officer until 1996 and when one 
was introduced, he did not have access to all necessary information.
12 As a result, Nissan did 
not know whether a particular car it was selling was making money for the company or not. In 
addition to the sale of non-core assets, one pillar in the effort to reduce Nissan’s crippling debt 
burden consequently was to make the management of the company’s financial operations a 
top priority, centralizing financial functions in Tokyo, and repatriating debt to Japan.  
 
                                                 
12 Ghosn and Riès (2005). 
  5But the overhaul of the way Nissan does business did not stop there. Other areas affected were 
the company’s employment policies, where merit-based promotions and remuneration 
replaced the traditional seniority-based system; the introduction of outside talent not only 
from Renault, but also from other Japanese companies such as the new head of design, who 
came from rival car maker Isuzu; and the company’s communication with the press, 
shareholders, and employees, establishing a culture of corporate transparency.  
 
What many of the measures have in common is that they have instilled a profit-orientation 
into Nissan’s operation that was previously lacking and have turned the company from one 
that only had a strong worldwide presence into one that actually coordinates all its activities 
from a global perspective. This approach is most visible in the reorganization of Nissan’s 
purchasing policy and the relationship with its suppliers. But it can also be seen in the 
company’s financial operations, its product design strategies, and the deployment of assets.
13
 
The outcome of the restructuring effort is well-know: a turnaround from the record loss in 
1999 to successive record profits in every one of the following years and industry-leading 
operating margins. What is more, the declining trend in domestic sales has been reversed and 
Nissan appears to have been able to steal market share from rivals Honda, Mazda and 
Mitsubishi, the latter having suffered a collapse in sales in recent years due to ongoing quality 
problems. The number of Nissan’s worldwide employees, on the other hand, has continued to 
contract slightly to about 123,700, down from 141,500 before the restructuring efforts began.   
 
 
Renault-Nissan: The repercussions 
 
The repercussions of the alliance between Renault and Nissan go considerably beyond its 
immediate impact on the Japanese carmaker itself, its suppliers, and its rivals. From the start, 
the Renault-Nissan case has been in the public eye like few other foreign direct investments, 
meaning that it has played an important role in shaping public perceptions of foreign 
companies and their business methods in Japan. For example, cutting the global workforce by 
10 percent, closing five factories in Japan, and selling most of Nissan’s shareholdings, were 
drastic steps by Japanese standards. But because they were quickly vindicated by greatly 
improved business results, they have probably helped to make such measures more acceptable, 
though so far no other major car manufacturer, none of which have been in similarly dire 
straits, has followed suit.  
 
Turning to the impact of the alliance on Japan’s auto industry, it would be difficult to claim 
that Renault’s investment in Nissan has led to greatly increased price competition or 
introduced qualitatively new products in the market. Of course, Nissan’s renewed strength 
exerts pressure on its rivals, but, as already mentioned, Japan’s car industry is used to fierce 
competition at home. Similarly, Nissan’s revival of course partly owes to newly developed 
products that appeal to consumers, but these do not represent a genuinely new type of product 
previously unavailable in Japan.  
 
However, there are at least two areas in which the Renault-Nissan alliance has had an impact 
on its peers and the wider industry. The first of these is managements’ focus on profitability. 
For much of the post-war era and continuing well into the 1990s, Japanese business strategies 
                                                 
13 For example, design units in Japan and the United States now work closely together to build a global brand 
identity. And almost at the same time that Nissan was closing factories in Japan, where it was suffering from 
excess capacity, it was building a new factory in the United States for the production of pick-up trucks for the 
North American market. 
  6tended to focus on market share; profitability, in contrast, often was a secondary objective. In 
recent years, though, a greater emphasis on profits and profitability can be observed. For 
example, in Toyota’s annual report for FY2000, the word “profitability” appears only three 
times, and each time only in a general discussion of what factors might affect the company’s 
financial results. But that number increases to twelve in the FY2004 annual report, which is 
littered with statements such as: “[O]ne of the major management tasks that Toyota faces 
today is the optimal deployment of its existing management resources to facilitate business 
expansion, strengthen profitability, and train personnel” [emphasis added].
14 While no similar 
linguistic shift can be observed at Nissan’s and Toyota’s main rival, Honda – the term 
“profitability” does not occur once – the FY2004 annual report does carry this statement: 
“[W]e consider redistribution of profits to shareholders as one of our most important 
management issues.”
15 An important reason for the growing emphasis on profitability and 
shareholder value probably is the increasing ratio of shares held by foreign portfolio 
investors.
16 However, another contributing factor is likely to have been Ghosn’s single-
minded focus on bottom line results at Nissan. Not only has this increased the pressure on 
other company’s do likewise, Nissan’s industry-leading operating margins have also raised 
the bar for its competitors.   
 
The other area where the Nissan-Renault alliance has had wider repercussions is in the 
supplier industry. As mentioned above, the reorganization of Nissan’s parts purchases 
consisted of two elements: first, the streamlining of such purchases on a global scale through 
the Renault Nissan Purchasing Organization. Traditionally, Nissan had placed orders for the 
same part with more than one keiretsu supplier. Now, however, mass orders were to be placed 
with one global supplier. For Renault and Nissan, this meant they were able to exploit 
synergies and gain bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers as a result of the increased scale of 
orders, while suppliers were able to exploit economies of scale, helping them to lower costs. 
But for Nissan’s traditional keiretsu suppliers, the new arrangement also meant increased 
competition and screening out as the number of Nissan’s suppliers was halved from around 
1,200 to about 600.
17  
 
The second element in the reorganization of parts purchases was the dissolution of Nissan’s 
keiretsu, i.e. the sale of its stakes in all but four of the 1,394 companies in which Nissan held 
stocks. Rather than indiscriminately offloading its shareholdings, though, Nissan typically 
sought to arrange tie-ups with other Japanese or with foreign companies.
18 The most 
important among the domestic tie-ups was that between Calsonic and Kansei, creating a 
global player that has been able to boost sales by 70 percent from a combined ¥405 billion 
before the merger (2000) to ¥695 billion in 2004. Meanwhile, the car electronics business of 
Unisia Jecs, another major keiretsu supplier, was sold to Hitachi (which turned the company 
into a wholly-owned subsidiary in 2002), while the transmission division was sold to Valeo of 
France, one of the biggest parts makers in Europe and the largest parts suppliers to Renault.
19 
                                                 
14 Toyota Annual Report 2004, p.11. 
15 Honda Annual Report 2004, p.3. 
16 The percentage of shares held by foreign investors in Toyota in March 2005 was 23.3 percent, while the 
corresponding figure for Honda was 35.8 percent. Source: Japan Company Handbook (Japanese version). 
17 See Ikeda and Nakagawa (2002) and Magee (2003). 
18 In selling its stakes in suppliers, Nissan was careful not let suppliers fall into the hands of its Japanese 
competitors. This explains why a large number of suppliers were sold to foreign companies. For the same reason, 
suppliers were also not sold to financial firms, because these might resell suppliers to domestic competitors. See 
Economic and Social Research Institute (2005).    
19 Further examples of domestic tie-ups involving Nissan suppliers abound, including the acquisition of a 6.5 
percent stake in Kinugawa Rubber by Toyo Tire and Rubber (1999), a 23.4 percent stake in Exidy by Aisin Seiki 
(2001), a 23.7 percent stake in Fuki Kiko by Koyo Seiki (2001), etc. Source: JETRO (2005a).     
  7Valeo was also encouraged by Ghosn and his team to acquire Nissan’s shareholdings in 
Ichikoh Industries, which in turn invested capital in Valeo.
20 Other international tie-ups 
involving major Nissan suppliers were the sale of seat maker Ikeda Bussan to Johnson 
Controls of the U.S., and of a 30.8 percent equity stake in suspension maker Yoruzu to Tower, 
also of the U.S.  
 
The dissolution of the Nissan keiretsu thus has allowed a number of foreign companies to 
become suppliers to Nissan for the first time. More than that: it has provided them with 
production bases in Japan through the joint ventures and capital tie-ups they entered with 
former Nissan affiliates. But the alliances also provide benefits for the Japanese side. The tie-
up between Valeo and Ichikoh, for example, includes the shared utilization of plants, thus 
giving the latter a foothold in Europe and elsewhere, helping it to meet Nissan’s requirement 
for suppliers that are competitive on a global scale.  
 
 
Suppliers and the keiretsu 
 
The described tie-ups between former Nissan keiretsu members and foreign parts makers 
represent only a fraction of the growing tide of collaborations between Japanese suppliers and 
foreign counterparts. Between 1997 and 2004, there were at least 24 cases in which foreign 
parts manufacturers have acquired stakes in Japanese companies or entered joint ventures.
21  
This development forms part of a worldwide trend toward modularization and systematization, 
in which suppliers deliver parts to auto manufacturers in the shape of partially assembled 
units (modules) and functionally integrated units (systems), with parts suppliers assuming 
responsibility for design and development as well as assembly, and which, in turn, has led 
suppliers to broaden their capabilities through joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions.
22 
Driven largely by American and European mega-suppliers such as Delphi and Visteon (the 
former in-house part manufacturing departments of GM and Ford), Bosch (Germany), ZF 
Sachs (Germany) and Valeo (France), the supplier industry thus has seen a similar trend 
toward global integration as the car assembly industry itself. 
 
Despite the size of Japan’s car industry, only two of the country’s suppliers, Denso and Aisin 
Seiki, both affiliates of Toyota, rank among the global top ten. Most other suppliers, though 
strong in specialized niche markets, lack the scale of their foreign competitors, as indicated by 
their respective sales, which for many Japanese parts makers are in the order of several 
hundred billion yen (several billion US$), compared with several trillion yen (tens of billion 
US$) for the likes of Bosch, Delphi, or Visteon.
23 This means that many Japanese suppliers 
are struggling to muster the financial and managerial resources to provide the global supply 
capacity and enhanced development capability required by carmakers today.
24 While some 
Japanese parts makers have acquired foreign affiliates, accepting foreign capital through 
M&As or entering joint ventures often represents the best way to respond to globalization and 
the need for modularization and systemization. 
 
                                                 
20 Ikeda and Nakagawa (2002). 
21 Based on JETRO (2005a: 70-71), Figure 49.  
22 Development Bank of Japan (2000). 
23 Calsonic and Kansei, the two former Nissan keiretsu suppliers, for example, had sales of ¥280 billion and 
¥130 billion, respectively, in 2000, the year before their merger. Even after the merger and rapid growth, the 
sales of about ¥700 billion in 2004 reached only about a quarter of Delphi’s or Bosch’s (automotive technology 
only), which were in the region of US$30 billion. 
24 Development Bank of Japan (2000). 
  8The dismantling of the Nissan keiretsu with the aim not only of returning Nissan’s balance 
sheet to an even keel but also of creating a network of world-class suppliers that can shoulder 
greater responsibilities in terms of independent design and development of modules clearly 
fits in with this pattern. However, it is important to note that the issue of supplier-
manufacturer relationships is not a question of “superior” Western management techniques 
versus “outdated” Japanese practices. A case in point is Toyota, which has gone from strength 
to strength, overtaking Ford as the world’s second-largest automotive manufacturer in terms 
of sales (if the sales of truck maker Hino are included). Yet, Toyota has gone in the opposite 
direction from Nissan, raising its shareholding in compact car maker Daihatsu to a majority 
stake in 1998 and making truck maker Hino a subsidiary in 2001, while its closest affiliate 
and former parent, Toyoda Automatic Loom, increased its ownership of Toyota’s most 
important suppliers, Denso and Aisin Seiki.
25  Such steps have been interpreted as defensive 
moves to reassert control over keiretsu members at a time when these large suppliers were 
becoming increasingly independent-minded and foreigners were acquiring stakes in parts 
makers that were also important suppliers to Toyota.
26 Yet, it is interesting to note that Nissan, 
too, has recently moved to strengthen its ties with remaining keiretsu suppliers again. Having 
at one point considered selling its stake in Calsonic to Delphi, Nissan raised its shareholding 
in the merged Calsonic Kansei in November 2004 from 27.6 percent to 41.7 percent, turning 
it into a consolidated subsidiary in order to retain close control over a supplier that provides 
the company with key technology.
27 Thus, it remains to be seen what kind of supplier network 
configurations will prove more successful in the future. What is clear, though, is that the 
growing presence of both foreign carmakers and parts suppliers has led to a greater diversity 
in organizational arrangements.     
 
The Toyota example also shows that the keiretsu  and traditional supplier-assembler 
relationships continue to matter in large parts of Japan’s automotive industry. One important 
reason that Toyota has strengthened the relationship with its suppliers is that it wants to retain 
close control over product development for parts and components. This type of strategy, 
however, has also led to complaints from foreign parts companies that suppliers are still 
expected to “build-to-print” the traditional Japanese way, suggesting that they continue to face 
difficulties in doing business in Japan as a result of the reluctance to outsource product 
development on a global basis.
28 Similarly, even though European suppliers have been able to 
expand their sales in Japan, the supplied parts and components are largely for vehicles 
destined for export to European markets only and not for models sold in Japan, the U.S. or 
other overseas markets. While this helps Japanese car manufacturers to meet European 
standards and reduce political friction, it limits European suppliers’ prospects in Japan.
29
 
Finally, another illustration of the continuing importance of the keiretsu is provided by the 
hapless DaimlerChrysler-Mitsubishi Motors alliance. MMC’s membership of the larger 
Mitsubishi keiretsu, the core of which includes Tokyo Mitsubishi Financial Group, Mitsubishi 
Corporation, and Mitsubishi Industries, is generally considered to be a major reason why the 
alliance failed. Not only did the tightly-knit keiretsu relationships make it more difficult for 
the new German management to overhaul supplier relationships. The knowledge that in an 
emergency the other group companies would come to the rescue, as they eventually did, also 
                                                 
25 Hino website; Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001). 
26 See Purchasing.com, “Supplier landscape shifts as companies seek global strategies”, 13 January, 2000 
27 Economic and Social Research Institute (2005) and The Nikkei Weekly (online), 24 January, 2005, “Ghosn 
recasting keiretsu supplier.” The latter quotes Ghosn as saying: “Not everything about the keiretsu is wrong. It 
simply did not function properly under Nissan in the past. From now on, we need stronger ties.”   
28 Autoasia, Q1, 2004, p.68. 
29A.N.R. Millington, Director General of the Tokyo Office of the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, interview on 13 May 2005. 
  9meant that at MMC there was much less of a sense of crisis and much greater resistance to 
change than at Nissan. Following scandals involving cover-ups of defective vehicles and 
mounting losses, MMC was abandoned to its fate by DaimlerChrysler in August 2004 and its 





Globalization of the car industry has proceeded rapidly over the past decade or so, and today, 
most major players operate, either directly or through alliances, in the major markets of North 
America, Europe, Asia and beyond. Among Japan’s industries, too, the automotive sector has 
been at the vanguard of internationalization, both through exports and overseas production. 
Yet, Japan’s car industry remains much less globalized than its counterparts in Europe and the 
United States. Not only is there no wholly-foreign carmaker manufacturing vehicles in Japan. 
If the Nissan case is representative, Japanese companies, although operating internationally, 
have also been slow to adopt an integrated global business perspective.  
 
At least to some extent, this has begun to change in recent years. Foreign companies have 
been able to make inroads, entering equity participations or joint ventures with Japanese 
companies. In the process, they have introduced advanced management techniques (such as in 
Nissan’s financial operations) and Western-style employment practices (such as performance-
based promotion and remuneration). They have also contributed to a shift in the management 
objective of Japanese companies from market share to profitability.  
 
But probably the most important area in which foreign companies have been a catalyst for 
change is in industry structure. The dissolution of the Nissan keiretsu has meant that, on the 
one hand, about half of the company’s traditional suppliers have lost (one of) their main 
customer(s). On the other hand, the reorganization of parts procurements at Nissan has helped 
some traditional suppliers, such as Calsonic Kansei, to expand, and has opened the door to 
new, often foreign suppliers. But consolidation in the supplier industry has not been confined 
to Nissan keiretsu members, as a growing number of foreign companies have acquired stakes 
in other Japanese counterparts or entered joint ventures. This not only has made the 
composition of the car industry in Japan more international but has also helped Japanese 
suppliers to strengthen their global capabilities to serve customers worldwide. 
 
 
3. Banking and insurance 
 
Long cosseted by government regulation and structural entry barriers, the banking and 
insurance sectors provide a vivid illustration both of the substantial changes that have taken 
place in Japan over the past decade and of the remaining challenges ahead if the country is to 
develop globally competitive service industries. To be sure, much of the transformation of 
Japan’s financial sector is the result of domestic forces and foreign companies have at best 
played a marginal role. Yet, in those areas where foreign players have gained a foothold, their 
impact is clearly visible.  
 
However, to understand the role of foreign direct investment in the sector, it is necessary to 
make a brief excursion and consider banks’ and, to a lesser extent, insurance companies’ 
place in Japan’s economic system. Financial institutions have been at the heart of what by the 
1980s often came to be referred to as “Japan Inc.”, the monolithic keiretsu system with the 
  10banks and insurance companies at the center of tightly-knit webs of cross-shareholdings. A 
central element of this arrangement, in turn, was the main-bank system, characterized by 
strong established ties between domestic banks and their corporate clients. Loans from city 
banks (commercial banks) would typically provide the main source of external funds for most 
companies and banks often held significant equity interests in their corporate clients, getting 
closely involved in companies’ managerial affairs in time of financial distress. Similarly, 
insurance companies would be major long-term shareholders in firms belonging to the same 
business grouping. Under this arrangement, stringent government regulation of the financial 
sector and the “convoy system” – meant to guarantee stability by preventing laggards from 
falling behind and leaders from moving too far ahead – thwarted competition and innovation 
in products and services and conventional lending to corporate clients provided the major 
source of income for Japanese banks. Likewise, insurance companies all tended to offer the 
same standardized services and products.  
 
However, the traditional system has come under substantial strain as a result of the ongoing 
economic malaise, financial deregulation, and other economic reforms. In the banking sector, 
non-performing loans – a hang-over from the burst of the bubble economy – and failure on 
the part of the government to decisively deal with the problem meant that by the end of the 
1990s, the entire financial system was teetering on the brink of collapse. Between 1997 and 
2003, a number of securities firms, including one of the country’s Big Four, Yamaichi, two of 
the three long-term lending banks, Long Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank, and 
several regional banks, including Hokkaido Takushoku, Kofuku, and Ashikaga banks, went 
bankrupt and, in most cases, were nationalized.  
 
The life insurance industry was similarly creaking under the burden of negative carrying costs 
– the shortfall between guaranteed pay-outs to customers on insurance products and the 
minimal or negative return on assets resulting from the Bank of Japan’s zero interest rate 
policy and slumping stock and real estate markets. All in all, a total of 20 banks, 27 credit 
unions, 181 credit unions, seven life insurers, two property and casualty insurers, and seven 
securities companies went bankrupt in the period between 1992 and 2003.
30
 
A complete meltdown of the financial system was averted only through the injection of 
massive government funds, resulting in the quasi-nationalization of a large part of the banking 
sector and providing the impetus for substantial industry consolidation across traditional 
keiretsu  lines.  The Industrial Bank of Japan, Fuji Bank, and Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, for 
example, merged to form the Mizuho Financial Group, while Sumitomo Bank and Sakura 
Bank joined forces to become the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. The mergers were 
made possible by a series of financial sector reforms commonly labeled as Japan’s “Big 
Bang” in reference to Britain’s financial market deregulation in 1986. The reforms for the first 
time since before the Second World War allowed Japanese firms to form holding companies 
and led to further financial sector consolidation in other areas such the securities industry. 
 
But the “Big Bang” reforms were intended to achieve much more than aid industry 
consolidation, aiming, as they did, at turning Tokyo into a global financial center on par with 
London and New York. To this end, controls on foreign exchange transactions, fixed share-
trading commissions, and government-stipulated uniform insurance premiums were abolished. 
In addition, for the first time, banks were allowed to enter the securities business and barriers 
between the insurance business and banking, securities, and trust banking were lifted.  
 
                                                 
30 Number of bankruptcies from Horiuchi (2004). 
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31 they 
certainly form part of a long-term transition in Japan’s financial system from a bank-centered 
to a financial-market centered one. The beginnings of this trend date back to the late 1980s, 
when large Japanese corporations began raising external funds through foreign and domestic 
bond issues. Since then, bank debt as a source of funding for large, publicly trade firms has 
declined further in importance.
32 Shrinkage and consolidation in the banking sector therefore 
are likely to continue. On a brighter note, however, Japanese banks finally appear to be 
making progress in the disposal of non-performing loans – one important reason why the 
economic gloom over Japan has finally lifted.  
 
 
Foreign direct investment in the financial sector – an overview 
        
Foreign direct investment trends clearly reflect the changed conditions in Japan’s financial 
sector. Government regulations and close ties between banks and corporate customers meant 
that foreign financial institutions have long struggled to penetrate the Japanese market, and 
until the mid-1990s, banking and insurance accounted for less than 5 percent of total FDI 
inflows. Since then, however, FDI in the sector has skyrocketed, accounting for 41 percent of 
total inflows between 1997 and 2004, making banking and insurance by far the leading 
industry in every year, with the sole exception of 1999, when it was eclipsed by the car 
industry.
33 As a result, financial intermediary services and insurance today are the industries 
with by far the highest share of employment by foreign-owned companies in the service 
sector in Japan (see Table 1). What is more, foreign investment in the finance and insurance 
sector has remained buoyant, setting a new record in 2004, rather than, as in other sectors, 
contracting again as the global FDI boom subsided. 
 
Three major reasons for the increase in foreign investment in the banking and insurance sector 
can be identified. The first and most obvious is deregulation. Although foreign banks continue 
to complain that Japan’s financial industries remain more heavily regulated than their 
American or British counterparts,
 34 the Big Bang reforms have broadened the areas in which 
foreign financial institutions can bring their expertise to bear. The same is true for the 
insurance sector, where deregulation has allowed life and non-life insurers to enter each 
others’ business, abolished government-stipulated premium rates, and streamlined the 
approval of new insurance products (see below). The second reason is the gradual 
transformation of Japan’s financial system from a bank-centered to a capital-market centered 
one. As securities markets as an alternative source of funding gain in importance, the role of 
established main-bank relationships is diminishing, removing one of the major obstacles for 
foreign banks operating in Japan.  
 
But in and of themselves, these two factors probably would not have been sufficient to draw 
the substantial amounts of foreign direct investment actually witnessed. Rather, they provided 
the backdrop to the third major event: the deepening economic and financial crisis that 
produced a significant number of take-over targets. Generally reluctant to take over operating 
banks and insurance companies because of the heavy risks involved, foreign investors were 
much more willing to acquire failed institutions and, as indicated above, they were spoilt for 
choice. In the banking sector, Merrill Lynch, for example, took over the distribution network 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., The Economist, “Bang, pop or splutter?”, 7 May 1998. 
32 See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), chapter 7. 
33 Based on MOF notification statistics. 
34 A frequently cited example of remaining obstacles is Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law, which 
separates the banking and securities business. 
  12of Yamaichi Securities; a group of foreign investors, led by Ripplewood Holdings, bought the 
failed Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, since revived as Shinsei Bank; and Nippon 
Investment Partners, a special-purpose fund set up by the Asia Recovery Fund, bought the 
operations of Kofuku Bank, a regional institution that collapsed in 1999 and has since been 
reopened as Kansai Sawayaka Bank (KS Bank). Meanwhile, in the insurance sector, foreign 
investors have snapped up five out of the nine life insurers that failed between 1997 and 2001. 
(In contrast with the banking sector, there were also four instances in which foreign insurers 
bought Japanese counterparts that had not (yet) gone bankrupt. See Table 3 below).  
 
Although foreign-owned firms continue to account for only a fraction of the banking and 
insurance business overall, they have been able to carve out significant market shares in some 
areas which, moreover, are typically growing much more rapidly than the traditional segments 
in which domestic firms dominate. Much of this success owes to the global capabilities, 
professionalism, and sophisticated risk management techniques foreign multinationals have 
developed while operating in the more advanced and deregulated markets of the United States 
and Europe. The presence of such global players as well as the products and services they 
offer have affected their industries in various ways. The following sections examine this 
impact in greater detail, looking at investment banking, retail banking, and the life insurance 
industry respectively.  
 
 
Investment Banking  
 
The banking and finance sector spans a wide range of services, including retail and 
commercial banking, investment banking, securities trading, and asset management. It is in 
the latter areas – investment banking, securities trading and asset management – that foreign 
financial institutions have made by far the greatest inroads into the Japanese market. What is 
more, although most of the major international players have been in Japan since the 1980s, it 
is only since the second half of the 1990s that they have begun to make their presence felt. 
This success has been based on a combination of the developments described above – 
deregulation, the transition to capital markets-based financial system, and economic malaise – 
and foreign investment banks’ expertise, which has allowed them to compensate for what they 
lack in local knowledge and access, on which traditional relational banking is based, with 
transactional and technical know-how.  
 
The following examples illustrate the interplay between structural change, the demand for 
investment banking services, and the role of foreign companies providing such services. Even 
before the Big Bang, the ongoing recession created what is often called the “distress business”, 
such as the disposal of bad loans, the unwinding of cross-shareholdings, the raising of capital 
from foreign investors for cash-strapped companies, and the development of derivatives that 
provided firms with ways to offload risk or disguise financial problems. Requiring extensive 
technical expertise and access to foreign institutional investors that would buy these 




Structural change and economic reforms have also led to a large increase in M&A activity in 
Japan since the mid-1990s. Not only have out-in M&As as the preferred means of market 
entry for foreign firms jumped with the overall rise in FDI; there has also been a substantial 
growth in domestic M&A activity, and foreign investment banks have been able to get hold of 
                                                 
35 The Economist, “Rich pickings for the gaijin”, 14 May, 1998.  
  13a large share of this business as well, based on their international experience in M&A deals. 




The transition from a bank-centered to a capital market-based financial system, meanwhile, 
means that companies increasingly access capital markets directly to meet their financing 
needs by issuing bonds and equities. Although in most cases, the main underwriter of such 
securities typically still is Japanese, foreign investment banks often are joint book runners 
thanks to their superior access to international investors.
37 Such access to international 
investors, in turn, has grown in importance as foreigners have been the most important net 
buyers of Japanese shares in recent years.
38 In fact, to a large exten t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
unwinding of cross-shareholdings, the percentage of Japanese shares held by foreign investors 
has risen from only 4.7 percent (in terms of market value) in 1990 to 23.7 percent in 2004.
39 
What is more, foreigners tend to be more active shareholders than their Japanese counterparts, 
buying and selling shares more frequently, so that foreigners now account for about a third of 
all trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Figure 1). And since foreign investors prefer 
dealing with foreign firms, it is widely thought that this trend has helped to lift the share of 




Insert Figure 1 
 
 
But another reason that foreign investment banks have been able to gain a larger share in 
trading volume is their investment in information technology and IT skills. Morgan Stanley, 
for example, has heavily invested in a trading engine that is able to execute trades much 
quicker and at much larger volumes than most of its competitors, allowing it to offer better 
prices for its customers, including many Japanese ones.
41 Yet another growth area in which 
foreign financial institutions have been able to make inroads is asset management. The 
amount of assets managed by investment advisors has risen fivefold from ¥34.8 trillion in 
1992 to ¥112.5 trillion in 2005,
42 but while foreign-affiliated companies have been able to 
build up assets under management, domestic ones have been losing them.
43  
 
                                                 
36  Source: Thomson Financial press release. Online: <http://www.thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/financial/ 
league_table/mergers_and_acquisitions/4Q2004/4Q04_MA_PR_Jap_Finl_Adv.pdf> (accessed 23 June, 2005). 
37 According to Bloomberg, the top 10 underwriters of stock and convertible bond sales in Japan were ranked as 
follows: Nikko Citigroup – jointly owned by Citigroup of the U.S. and Nikko Cordial, Japan’s third-biggest 
brokerage – led the pack with a market share of 27.3 percent and 15 issues, followed by Nomura, Daiwa, and 
Mizuho with a combined market share of 50.0 percent and a total of 57 issues. Among the remaining six firms of 
the top 10, only one was Japanese (Shinko Securities, market share: 1.9 percent, 13 issues), while the other five 
were foreign: Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, UBS and Merrill Lynch with a combined market 
share of 17.9 percent, but only 6 issues  (Bloomberg,  “Nikko Citigroup eclipses Nomura as Top Japan Stock 
Underwriter”, 30 March, 2005). 
38 The Economist, “The last, best game”, 20 October, 2005. 
39  Figures from: 2004 Share Ownership Survey. Online:  <http://www.tse.or.jp/english/data/research/ 
english2004.pdf> (accessed 23 June, 2005). 
40 Mitsui Kaijo Kiso Kenkyujo (2001: 49).  
41 Thomas Riley, Managing Director, Morgan Stanley Japan, interview on 12 October 2005.  
42  Source: Japan Investment Advisers Association, Statistical Releases, June 2005 (Online: 
<http://jsiaa.mediagalaxy.ne.jp/toukei_e/index.html>, accessed 25 October 2005).  
43 Nikkei Net Interactive, 20 November 2003, “Market scramble: Foreign asset management firms hone edge” 
(Online, accessed 25 October 2005). 
  14As these examples have illustrated, foreign financial institutions have been able to gain 
significant market shares in a number of investment banking, securities, and asset 
management-related areas. There are a number of reasons that explain this success. The first 
is that, as Japan makes the transition from a bank-centered to a capital market-centered 
financial system, there is a growing demand for the services that investment banks offer. Not 
only are traditional bank loans, and with them established main-bank relationships 
diminishing in importance, while securities markets as alternative sources of funding are 
playing a larger role. The financial troubles experienced by many Japanese companies also 
meant that there was ample need for innovative approaches to the restructuring of corporate 
finances, for example through the securitization of assets and liabilities.  
 
The second, and closely related, reason is that, with their global presence and capabilities, 
foreign investment banks are well placed to capitalize on this shift to capital market-based 
corporate financing and other structural changes taking place in the Japanese economy. 
Investment banking is a business that requires advanced technologies and extensive expertise, 
including, for example, sophisticated computer software, mathematical talent, and portfolio 
modelling capabilities to manage risk and develop innovative financial products – areas in 
which most Japanese banks have lagged behind.
44  Combining these capabilities with an 
understanding of global markets, foreign investment banks, according to a foreign industry 
insider, have introduced a degree of professionalism to the investment process in Japan that 
was previously missing.
45 In the process, they have developed financial products such as 
credit derivates that were previously unavailable in Japan or investment products sold through 
smaller securities firms that broaden the choice available to private investors. 
 
The third reason that foreign investment banks have been able to gain market share is that 
Japanese banks have been slow to close the gap with their overseas competitors in this 
business area. There appear to be a number of factors explaining why this is the case. The first 
is that investment banking has been low in Japanese financial institutions’ order of priorities, 
as is illustrated by the importance attached to the various parts of the financial conglomerates. 
In the case of the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, for example, the holding company takes 
pride of place, followed by commercial banking (Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi), trust banking 
(The Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation), and only then investment banking 
(Mitsubishi Securities, a minor player in the industry).
46 The second and closely related 
reason why Japanese banks have failed to close the gap is their organizational framework, 
which continues to be dominated by rigid hierarchies and pay structures.
47 Unable or 
unwilling to pay competitive salaries, Japanese banks, find it difficult to attract the necessary 
talent, for example by poaching experienced staff from their foreign rivals.
48 Rather, the flow 
has generally been one way, with staff from Japanese banks moving to their foreign 
counterparts. What is more, foreign investment banks in recent years have become one of the 
most sought-after destinations among high-flying university graduates.
49 A third reason is that, 
despite the Big Bang, Japan’s financial sector continues to be more tightly regulated than its 
counterparts in the United States and many European countries. Coupled with Japanese 
banks’ weak presence in more advanced overseas markets, this means that Japanese banks 
have little opportunity to develop the skills necessary to compete with their industry-leading 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Rapp (1999).  
45 Jean-Francois Minier, Chairman of the EBC Banking Committee, interview on 11 May, 2005.  
46 I am grateful to Jean-Francois Minier, Chairman of the EBC Banking Committee, for this point.  
47 The Economist, “Rich pickings for the gaijin”, 14 May 1998. Though dating from 1998, this observations 
applies as much today as it did back then. 
48 This, of course, assumes that they would be interested in doing so in the first place. 
49 The Nikkei Weekly, “Foreign investment banks flourishing from local talent”, 2 May, 2005. 
  15Western counterparts. Compare this not only with the large American investment banks, with 
their home base in the world’s most advanced financial market and a presence in all major 
financial centers, but also with some of the German, Swiss, or Dutch banks. Even though the 
financial markets of the latter’s home base may not be as large or advanced, they have a 
strong presence in New York and London, providing exposure and hence learning 
opportunities in the most sophisticated markets. 
 
That Japanese financial institutions do not accord a higher priority to investment banking and 
revise organizational hierarchies and pay structures to attract high-flyers indicates that 
Japanese banks either continue to be preoccupied with bringing their core business – 
commercial lending – into order; or that, to date, foreign investment banks are not perceived 
as a threat. The latter hypothesis is supported by a Japanese report on the effect of foreign 
competition in the financial industry on domestic players, which comes to the conclusion that 
with the exception of foreign-currency related business and share and bond issues, at present 
there is little direct rivalry between foreign and domestic institutions – they live in different 
“habitats.”
50   
 
The same report also suggests that the presence of foreign banks has provided little direct 
stimulus to Japan’s financial industry as a whole – simply because the overlap is so small.
51 
Nevertheless, the products, services, business models, and employment practices of Japanese 
banks are becoming more like those of their Western competitors. Japanese banks, for 
example, have become active in areas such as project finance and derivates trading and have 
adopted risk management techniques and more meritocratic salary schemes. What is more, 
although Japanese banks continue to lag behind in the development of innovative financial 
products, they have actively copied such products developed by foreign companies and in the 
process have learned from them. In other words, there are knowledge spillovers from foreign 
investment banks through product imitation. Thus, even if the gap in terms of technical 
expertise and innovative capabilities persists, the presence of foreign banks is raising the level 
of capabilities in Japanese financial institutions.  
 
But given the important role financial institutions play in the allocation of capital, it is 
important to look beyond the impact of foreign investment banks on the Japanese banking 
industry alone. One of the problems plaguing the Japanese corporate sector in recent decades 
has been the poor returns on capital. Although the effects are difficult to quantify, it seems 
fair to say that the products and services offered by foreign banks have helped to put capital 
resources to better use. One example is the services related to the restructuring of corporate 
finances, such as through the purchase and resale of distressed debt through securitization or, 
similarly, the purchase of poorly managed real estate, the introduction of professional 
management, and its resale through real estate funds, helping firms to return to financial 
health.  
 
In sum, rather than entering the low-margin corporate lending business, foreign banks in this 
segment appear content to concentrate on more profitable areas in which they can overcome 
whatever handicap they suffer from their lack of long-term relations through superior 
products, services, and technology previously unavailable in Japan. While this means that 
their activities remain confined to the investment banking business, this is a field that is bound 
to continue to grow in the future as Japan makes the transition to a capital-markets based 
financial system. And although the impact of foreign players on Japan’s banking sector has 
                                                 
50 Mitsui Kaijo Kiso Kenkyujo (2001: 54). 
51 Mitsui Kaijo Kiso Kenkyujo (2001: 55). 
  16remained limited, their products and services contribute to the ongoing restructuring of the 
country’s corporate sector more generally. 
 
 
Retail and commercial banking 
 
Whereas the investment banking, securities and asset management business has lured dozens 
of foreign firms to Japan, the number of foreign investments in the retail and commercial 
banking sector can be counted on one hand. What is more, the small number of cases there are 
fall into two distinct groups. The first consists only of Citibank as the sole foreign bank to 
have established retail operations in Japan. Citibank, in fact, traces its origins in Japan as far 
back as 1902, when its progenitor, the International Banking Corporation, opened a branch in 
Yokohama.
52 The second category, on the other hand, is made up of four Japanese banks that 
failed during the financial crisis in the late 1990s and that were purchased and subsequently 
revived by foreign investors: Shinsei Bank (formerly Long Term Credit Bank of Japan), 
Kansai Sawayaka Bank (KS Bank, formerly Kofuku Bank), Tokyo Star Bank (formerly 
Tokyo Sowa Bank), and Aozora Bank (formerly Nippon Credit Bank).
53 Despite their very 
different histories, these two groups have a number of features in common that distinguish 
them from their domestic counterparts.  
 
The first of these common features is that their operations are comparatively small. Citibank, 
for example, operates only 25 branches in the whole of Japan (most of them in the Tokyo 
area), Shinsei Bank has 36 branches (including seven sub-branches), and Tokyo Star Bank has 
32 branches, all in the capital.
54 These figures compare with the hundreds of branches that 
Japan’s city banks operate throughout the country. A second common feature is the attention 
paid to innovative (by Japanese standards) customer services. For example, as any foreign 
visitor to Japan will soon notice, even today it is difficult to find automated teller machines 
(ATMs) that operate 24 hours and/or accept foreign-issued debit or credit cards. Citibank, 
followed by a number of the resuscitated banks, has been the first to introduce such services, 
typically without the charges levied by the city banks for the use of cash dispensers outside 
business hours. Other ways in which these banks distinguish themselves is by offering bright, 
modern branches (with the back office hidden from the customer) and by introducing new 
products and services, including personal financial advisors, multipurpose and multicurrency 
accounts and, in the case of Citibank, services directed at internationally oriented customers 
such as commission free overseas cash withdrawals.  
 
A third common feature is that both Citibank and the revived smaller banks pursue more 
focused business models than their large Japanese counterparts, and one important area on 
which they have concentrated is consumer lending. Consumer finance is a segment which 
banks in Japan were historically barred from entering due to the government’s determination 
to channel scarce financial resources to investment rather than consumption during the 
country’s post-war industrialization drive. This situation gave rise to a vibrant consumer 
finance industry which, however, has enjoyed a dubious reputation due to the high rates of 
interest charged and tabloid stories of overborrowing by low-paid workers and housewives.
55 
                                                 
52 Harner (2000: 181). 
53 Aozora’s case is somewhat different form the three other failed banks in that the rescue was initially led by 
Japan’s Softbank. However, in 2003, the U.S. investment fund Cerberus, which had already held a minority 
stake in the bank, also acquired Softbank’s share, bringing Cerberus’ total stake to 62 percent.   
54 In fact, a significant reduction in the number of branches was one of the measures to turn the failed banks 
around. 
55 For an overview of Japan’s consumer finance industry, see, e.g., Harner (2000). 
  17In recent years, however, banks have started to move into consumer finance as well, with 
Citibank and the revived banks leading the way. Following the rescue by foreign investors, 
KS Bank, for example, streamlined its business to concentrate on lending to small and 
medium retailers and on consumer lending.
56 Similarly, Tokyo Star Bank has focused on 




This clear focus has helped Citibank and the resuscitated banks to be profitable at a time when 
Japan’s other banks have found it difficult to derive much value from their retail banking and 
commercial lending operations. However, focus provides only part of the explanation and this 
is where the stories of Citibank and the resuscitated banks part. Citibank’s operations in Japan 
form part of a long-term commitment to the Japanese market that has gradually evolved over 
the decades. Re-entering Japan as soon as the Second World War had ended, the bank handled 
foreign currency-related business on behalf of local counterparts during the 1950s, lent 
foreign currency to Japanese companies during the 1960s, and became involved in providing 
corporate loans and trade finance during the 1970s. It was not until the 1980s, following the 
first wave of financial deregulation in Japan, that Citibank began to move into retail banking. 
Expanding only gradually at first, Citibank’s retail operations received a significant boost as a 
result of the deepening financial crisis and weakening yen during the late 1990s, when 
worried savers flocked to the bank to open foreign currency accounts.
 58 As a result, the 
deposit base more than quadrupled in the space of only a few years.
59 Today, the operations of 
Citigroup, Citibank’s parent, in Japan also include Nikko Citigroup, the highly successful 
joint venture with the country’s third-largest brokerage.
 60 As this brief overview illustrates, 
Citbank’s position as the only foreign bank with retail operations in Japan is the result of 
unrivalled dedication to the Japanese market coupled with the ability to continuously innovate, 
adapt and exploit niches as they presented themselves.  
 
Compared with Citibank, the resuscitated banks represent foreign direct investment of an 
altogether different nature. Consisting of the purchase of existing, albeit bankrupt, banks, the 
acquisitions were backed, not by foreign banks that wanted to gain a foothold in Japan, but by 
private equity funds whose aim was to turn the banks around to sell them off again at a profit. 
Because of this focus on short-term gain, such funds, feeding off the “carcasses” of failed 
firms by stripping their assets, have often been labeled as “vulture funds.”  
 
Taking a closer look at the cases of Kofuku/KS Bank, LTCB/Shinsei Bank and Tokyo 
Sowa/Tokyo Star Bank, however, yields a less negative picture. The first thing to note is that 
in each of these instances, private equity investors, by overhauling management, introducing a 
more focused business model, investing in information technology and cutting costs, were 
able to restore these bankrupt banks to profitability. At Tokyo Star Bank, for example, almost 
half of the branches were shut and back-office operations were centralized in a Tokyo suburb. 
Staff levels were cut from 1,100 to 700, but have since increased again to around 900. As a 
result of these and other measures, profits jumped from ¥7.3 billion in 2002 to ¥13.1 in 2005. 
Once turned around, KS Bank was subsequently sold to the Bank of Kansai in 2003, while 
                                                 
56  ACCJ, FDI Case Studies, Kansai Sawayaka Bank (KS Bank). Online:  <http://www.accj.or.jp/ 
document_library/FDICaseStudies/1069040587.pdf> (accessed 27 October, 2005). 
57 Nikkei Net Interactive, “Tokyo Star Bank makes weak debut on price concerns”, 25 October 2005 (Online: 
<http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNKS/Search/Nni20051025D25JF825.htm>, accessed 25 October 2005).   
58 Harner (2000: 181-190).  
59 Harner (2000: 189). 
60 On a less positive note, Citibank suffered a serious setback in Japan when it was ordered, in 2004, to close its 
private banking business due to improper transactions and a flawed system of controls  (see, e.g., The Economist, 
“Sayonara”, 23 October 2004). 
  18Shinsei Bank and Tokyo Star Bank successfully returned to the stock market in 2004 and 
2005, respectively. This outcome provides a stark contrast with the situation only five years 




But it is also important to note that this turnaround could not have been achieved had the 
government not assumed a large portion of the banks’ bad loan burden. Nor were the new 
management methods without controversy. In particular, Shinsei’s refusal, in 2000, to 
participate in the debt forgiveness scheme for ailing retailer Sogo earned the bank much 
criticism from the political establishment. What is more, doubts remain regarding the long-
term prospects of Shinsei – despite its successful IPO in 2004 – and Aozora, the other former 
long-term credit bank.
62     
 
Considering that taxpayers shouldered a large part of the bad debt burden, whether the large 
gains that the private equity funds were indeed able to pocket upon the (partial) sale of their 
investments are justified remains a moot point.
63 Leaving such questions aside, what is clear, 
however, is that under foreign ownership, these banks have brought a breath of fresh air into 
Japan’s banking sector. Offering innovative services and consumer financial products, 
Citibank and the revitalized banks have led the way in providing consumers with greater 
choice and convenience – moves that some of the city banks are slowly beginning to follow.
64  
They have also broken with the mold of providing almost automatic debt forgiveness. In the 
Sogo episode, Shinsei Bank’s refusal to participate in the debt write-off led the government to 
attempt a bailout of the stricken retailer. However, following a public outcry, the government 
was forced to abandon this plan, resulting in Sogo’s collapse. The practice of keeping zombie 
firms alive nevertheless continues.  
 
Overall, although foreign-owned banks have introduced novel ideas and practices to Japan 
and, on occasion, have created quite a stir, their impact on the Japanese banking sector or the 
corporate world beyond has been rather limited. This is not surprising given their relatively 
small size. Even the largest of the revived banks, Shinsei Bank, which in its former 
incarnation as LTCB at one stage was the ninth-largest in the world, today only has a fraction 
of the assets (¥6.4 trillion) of Japan’s biggest, Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group (¥108.4 
trillion) before its merger with UFJ. And even taking Citibank and the other four foreign-
owned banks together, their branch networks pale in comparison with those of the country’s 
leading financial institutions. Therefore, the role of foreign-owned retail and commercial 
banks in Japan is at best marginal and is likely to remain so, given that it is highly improbable 






                                                 
61 See, e.g., The Economist, “Hard bargains”, 24 June 1999. 
62 On Shinsei, see, e.g., The Economist, “Reborn, remade, resold”, 15 January, 2004. 
63 In the case of Tokyo Star Bank, the offering of about 30 percent of outstanding shares was estimated to more 
than double Lone Star’s initial investment, and including the unsold portion, Tokyo Star was worth about 7 times 
the initial investment (The Standard, “Tokyo Star IPO set at top of range”, 18 October, 2005). WL Ross is said 
to have earned an 85 percent return on its $220 million investment when it sold most of its stake to Bank of 
Kansai (BusinessWeek Online, 23 February, 2004). And Ripplewood’s ¥120 billion investment was estimated to 
be worth  ¥1.5 trillion at the time of flotation in 2004 (The Economist, “Reborn, remade, resold”, 15 January, 
2004).   
64 See, e.g., The Economist, “At your service”, 25 September, 2003. 
  19Insurance 
 
In many ways, Japan’s insurance industry has traditionally shared many of the characteristics 
of the banking sector. Like the banks, insurance companies in Japan have been at the heart of 
the keiretsu system, acting as long-term stable shareholders in companies belonging to the 
same business group. Insurance companies also fell under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance, enjoying – like the banks – an explicit government guarantee but also having to 
submit to strict regulation. Analogous to the separation of business fields in the banking sector, 
there used to be strict barriers between the life and non-life insurance business. And just as 
there were restrictions on the range of financial products available in the banking sector and 
commissions were fixed, insurance products and premium rates were subject to approval by 
the Ministry. 
 
As in the banking sector, these arrangements created an industry in which the range of 
products on offer was limited, innovation was stunted, companies tended to be weak in 
managing risk, and competition followed its own peculiar logic. One major business area for 
insurance companies, for example, was the so-called dantai hoken (group insurance) covering 
all employees of a particular firm in one contract. Since insurers were unable to compete on 
price or through product differentiation, one important way in which they strove to secure 
such business for themselves was through keiretsu  shareholdings, thus providing one 
important explanation for this central feature of the Japanese economy. Another example of 
the type of inefficient competition that government regulation of the insurance sector gave 
rise is the door-to-door sale of life insurance products through so-called “bicycle ladies” who 
make up about 90 percent of the sales staff at life insurance firms.
65 Japan’s largest life insurer, 
Nippon Life, alone employed 53,000 such women.
66
 
What is more, operating in a large and, until the mid-1990s, growing home market, Japanese 
insurers neither saw the need nor possessed the skills to become international players.
67 At the 
same time, although foreign insurance companies were allowed to operate in Japan in 
principle, licenses for new entrants were only granted if they introduced novel products, 
which, however, where subject to lengthy approval procedures. The outcome was not that 
there were no foreign insurers operating in Japan. On the contrary: American Insurance Group 
(AIG) entered Japan as early as 1946, followed by American Family Assurance Company of 
Columbus (AFLAC) and Prudential in the 1970s, and each of these companies was able to 
build a successful business in the country.
68 But once established in Japan, these foreign 
players became as much part of the system as their domestic counterparts, barred from 
offering insurance products in rival business areas but also protected on their own turf from 
outside competition. Thus, despite some foreign participation, Japan’s insurance market was 
largely sheltered from full international competition.  
 
Much of this, however, has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s. As in the banking 
sector, deregulation and financial problems triggered by the deterioration of assets prices 
provided the trigger. Starting in 1996, the government introduced a series of amendments to 
the Insurance Business Law (the first modifications of the law in 56 years) that allowed life 
                                                 
65 Nikkei Net, “Nippon Life to hire more men for sales positions”, 3 March, 2005. 
66 Nikkei Net, “Nippon Life to hire more men for sales positions”, 3 March, 2005. 
67 Even today, the overseas insurance business of Japan’s largest life insurer, Nippon Life, for example, remains 
limited to relatively minor operations in the United States, China, the Philippines, and Thailand.  
68 American International Underwritiers (AIU), a non-life insurer that belongs to AIG came to Japan as early as 
1946. It was followed by Alico Japan, a branch of American Life Insurance Company that is also part of AIG, in 
as well as AFLAC in the early 1970s. Prudential first entered the Japanese market in 1979 by forming a joint 
venture with Sony.  
  20and non-life insurers to enter each other’s business, lifted the ban on insurance holding 
companies, changed product registration from an approval- to a notification-basis for many 
types of insurance, and streamlined the approval process, thus allowing greater product 
competition and innovation.
69 During the same period that these regulatory changes were 
enacted, insurance companies – and especially the life insurers – were falling on increasingly 
hard times. Having suffered a decade of losses caused by high guaranteed pay-outs to policy 
holders and dismal investment returns, nine life insurance companies and two non-life 
insurers collapsed between 1997 and 2001. Most of the failed life insurers were snapped up 
by foreign competitors, as were four life insurers that were bought before they went bankrupt 
(see Table 3). In addition, a number of foreign insurers established subsidiaries in Japan, 
meaning that most global players now have a presence in the country. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
 
In contrast with the banking sector, the entry of foreign firms in the insurance sector is 
contributing to substantial structural and other changes in the industry. One important reason 
is that in the banking sector, foreign investments have generally been confined to the 
establishment of subsidiaries in specialized niche markets (e.g. investment banking) or the 
acquisition of collapsed banks by private equity funds aiming to turn them around and then 
sell them on.
70 In contrast, foreign investments in the insurance industry, especially in the life 
insurance sector, primarily consisted of the acquisition of failed or struggling insurers by 
companies from the same industry aiming to gain a presence in the market.  
 
The most immediate measure of the impact of FDI in the insurance sector is foreign firms’ 
market share, which has grown rapidly in recent years. In the life insurance business, foreign 
companies’ market share in Japan in terms of premium income has risen from less than 5 
percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2004.
71 What is more, foreign life insurers have been able to 
enjoy rapid growth – the premium income of the 16 foreign companies offering life insurance 
products in Japan jumped by 38 percent in 2004
72 – at a time when the overall life insurance 
market has been shrinking.
73  
 
Foreign life insurers’ success in Japan greatly owes to their dominant position in the so-called 
third sector. Comprising products such as medical and nursing care insurance that fall 
between the traditional categories of life insurance on the one hand and property & casualty 
(p/c) insurance on the other, the third sector was long a niche market that only in recent years 
                                                 
69  For a detailed chronology of deregulation measures, see The Life Insurance Association of Japan, 
“Deregulation and Liberalization of the Japanese Life Insurance Market”. Online: <http://www.seiho.or.jp/ 
english/pdf/2004-2005/2005-04-c.pdf> (accessed 10 February, 2006). 
70 Of course, there are a number of exceptions, such as the purchase of the remnants of failed Yamaichi 
Securities by Merrill Lynch or joint ventures such as those between Citibank and Nikko in the securities business 
or, more recently, between Merrill Lynch and the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group in private banking.  
71 Sources: Nikkei Net, “Foreign Insurers Seek Novel Policies”, 12 May, 2003; Nikkei Net, “Foreign Life Insurers 
Grab 25% Share of Domestic Market”, 1 December, 2004; NLI Research Institute, “Financial Overview of Life 
Insurance Companies in Fiscal 2003”, online: <http://www.nli-research.co.jp/eng/resea/life/li040913.pdf>,  
Figure 1 (accessed 10 February, 2006). 
72 Nikkei Net, “16 Foreign Life Insurers Boost Premium Income 38%  in FY04”, 7 June, 2005. 
73 Life insurance business in force in Japan peaked in 1997 and has been steadily shrinking ever since. See The 
Life Insurance Association of Japan, online: <http://www.seiho.or.jp/english/pdf/2004-2005/2005-04-a.pdf> 
(accessed 10 February, 2006). 
  21has grown in popularity, accounting for about 30 percent of new policies in 2004. In contrast, 
death benefit products, the staple of Japanese life insurers, have steadily fallen out of favor.
74  
 
A number of factors have contributed to foreign insurers’ strong position in the third sector 
today. The first is that third-sector insurance products in Japan were in fact pioneered by 
foreign companies, with American Family (AFLAC) being the prime example. When AFLAC 
entered Japan in 1974, it was the first company to offer cancer insurance in a country where 
the disease was surrounded by social taboos and awareness was limited. Almost single-
handedly creating a market for such a product in an effort that spanned more than two decades, 
AFLAC by the late 1990s held 80 percent of the cancer insurance market.
75 In addition to 
introducing cancer insurance to Japan, AFLAC was also the first company to offer further 
innovative third-sector insurance products such as nursing care and specialized medical care 
insurance as supplements to Japan’s national health care system.
76
 
In addition to leadership in product innovation, a second factor behind foreign insurers’ 
success in Japan is price competitiveness. Foreign insurers generally have been able to offer 
products at low premiums that, moreover, are easy for customers to understand, while 
Japanese companies tend to sell more complex products with various additional benefits.
77 As 
a result, AFLAC’s medical insurance, for instance, is almost 40 percent cheaper than similar 
products available from the major domestic firms.
78 Underlying this cost competitiveness is 
the much greater degree of foreign insurers’ specialization. AFLAC’s concentration on third-
sector products is in stark contrast with traditional life insurers in Japan, which tended to be 
much less focused. In fact, imitating Nippon Life, the country’s largest life insurer, they 
would typically offer the entire product range, from A to Z, even if only a dozen policies of a 
particular type of insurance were sold.
79 Following deregulation and increasing competition, 
Japanese life insurers have been trying to become more focused, but this is a slow process as 
by far the largest proportion of business is with existing customers.  
 
Finally, AFLAC and other foreign companies have also benefited from a controversial deal 
struck between the Japanese and U.S. governments in 1996 that delayed the entry of Japanese 
firms into the third sector by first- and second-sector companies until 2001. Since complete 
liberalization in 2001, however, competition in the third sector has increased considerably, 
with major domestic life insurers offering specifically targeted third sector products.
80 The 
third sector is thus turning into a primary battleground in the life insurance industry. 
 
In other areas, too, Japanese life insurers are now trying to develop original and innovative 
products. They have begun to become more flexible in the premium discounts offered to 
individual customers, started to add various riders to traditional life insurance products, and 
developed investment-type life insurance products that were previously unavailable. In 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., Nikkei Net, “6 Major Foreign Life Insurers’ Premium Revenue Up 15% in FY04”, 31 May, 2005. 
75 Nikkei Net, “Foreign Insurers Cut Deeply Into Japanese Market”, 9 February, 2004. 
76 Harner (2000: 238). 
77 Nikkei Net, “6 Major Foreign Life Insurers’ Premium Revenue Up 15% in FY04”, 31 May, 2005. 
78 Nikkei Net, “6 Major Foreign Life Insurers’ Premium Revenue Up 15% in FY04”, 31 May, 2005. 
79 Hitoshi Morita, President and CEO, PCA Life, interview on 17 May, 2005. 
80 In 2004, Asahi Mutual Life, for example, began selling medical plans that cover operations to prevent varices, 
while Dai-ichi Mutual Life introduced lifelong medical care insurance that does not require premium payments if 
policy holders need nursing care (Japan Times, “Insurers race to get into medical policies as population ages”, 
26 February, 2005). Other traditional life insurers that have begun offering medical insurance products or life 
insurance products that also provide hospitalization and surgery benefits include Sumitomo Life, Nippon Life, 
and Meiji Yasuda Life (JETRO (2005b); Nikkei Net, “6 major foreign life insurers’ premium revenue up 15% in 
FY04”, 31 May, 2005). 
  22addition, life insurers are trying to improve their service, allowing customers, for example, to 
use ATMs at post offices and banks for insurance-related transactions.
81  
 
But product innovation and price competition are only two of the areas in which deregulation 
and increased foreign participation have led to a transformation of the industry. Other 
important areas include skill requirements, services, sales and distribution channels, and 
employment. These issues are obviously closely related. To stay with the example of third-
sector medical insurance, both the development and the marketing and sales of such products 
require skills that many Japanese insurers used to lack. Consequently, Nippon Life, for 
instance, set up a new medical research unit in 2005 that, consisting of a staff of 19, including 
seven physicians, is responsible for analyzing medical data with a view to developing new 
forms of medical insurance.
82  
 
The proliferation of new insurance products and the decline in sales of standard life insurance 
products also requires more professional sales forces. Nippon Life, for example, has found 
that the sales performance of its “bicycle ladies” has plummeted.
83 But again it is foreign 
companies have been leading the way in the professionalization of sales forces at the Japanese 
insurers they acquired, cutting the number of traditional sales agents, retraining personnel, 
hiring experienced salespeople from other industries, and moving to a sales system based on 
consulting services and “financial planners.”
84 Following its acquisition of Daihayku in 2001, 
Manulife, for instance, embarked on halving the number of sales agents at the Japanese 
company but was at the same time retraining remaining sales staff and recruiting 100 new 
sales people every month. One corollary, and gauge, of this professionalization is that the 
number of male sales staff is on the rise. Following the cue of foreign insurers, Sony Life, a 
relatively new market entrant, is stepping up insurance sales by male employees, who now 
account for more than 10 percent of overall insurance sales staff. Similarly, Nippon Life was 
planning to hire men with sales experience in real estate and other sectors and train these in 
life insurance. Beginning with 200 such personnel, the company was intending to eventually 
increase this number to 1,000.
85  
 
Similarly, again as a result of deregulation and led by foreign companies, insurers have been 
broadening their marketing channels. A number of them, including the AIG affiliates in Japan 
(Alico Japan, AIG Star Life, and AIG Edison Life), have expanded into direct marketing, 
including internet sales.
86 More important are the alliances that foreign insurers have forged 
with major as well as smaller second-tier and regional banks to sell individual pension 
insurance policies. Such ties have flourished since the ban on banks to sell insurance policies 
was lifted in October 2002 and foreign life insurers have teamed up with more than 200 
financial institutions. Alico Japan, for instance, has signed up with 81 banks, including all 
four megabanks. But other foreign insurers are not far behind. Having established ties with 
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advertising costs. PCA Life President and CEO Hitoshi Morita, for example, therefore thinks such efforts are 
primarily an attempt to raise brand awareness (interview, 17 May, 2005).  
  23regional banks earlier, ING Life in 2004 linked up with Mizuho and UFJ Bank, while AXA 
joined forces with Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. The latter, in turn, also sells policies for 
Manulife, with which BOT-Mitsubishi has an equity tie-up.
87 Providing insurers with new 
marketing channels while allowing banks to diversify their insurance offerings, such tie-ups 
are one major factor behind the expansion in foreign life insurers’ market share in Japan.  
 
The tie-ups also demonstrate that in the insurance sector foreign firms have become and 
established part of the landscape. Not only are they forging links with domestic financial 
institutions; consumers also do not appear to make any distinction between domestic and 
foreign providers.
88 Or, if considerations of nationality do play a role, this may actually play 
into the hands of overseas insurers given the failure of domestic providers around the turn of 
the millennium.  
 
Thus, comparing the role of foreign companies in the insurance and the banking sector, 
substantial differences can be observed. In the latter, the presence of foreign banks has only 
had a limited impact on their domestic counterparts. The insurance sector provides a stark 
contrast. Here, foreign companies have rapidly gained significant market share, contributed to 
increased price and product competition, and led the way in corporate restructuring. Operating 
in a deregulated and more competitive environment, Japanese insurers have been forced to 
follow suit, introducing third-sector products and upgrading skills by investing in product 
development capabilities and professionalizing sales forces. In other words, the entire modus 
operandi of the Japanese insurance industry has been transformed as a result of deregulation 
and foreign participation. In addition, with prices, product differentiation, and service levels 
now the defining competitive parameters, and a considerable number of insurers now in 
foreign hands, long-term shareholdings and keiretsu relationships, too, no longer play the role 
they once did. Thus, although there are of course many other reasons for the unwinding of 
cross-shareholdings among Japanese corporations, the competitive transformation of the 




The realignment of the Japanese insurance industry is likely to continue apace. Despite their 
success as a group, not all foreign insurers are thriving in Japan and their number has shrunk 
from a peak of 18 out of 41 life insurers operating in Japan in 2003 to 16 in 2005. At the same 
time, however, the total number of life insurers in Japan is very small compared with the 354 
companies found in the U.S., the 455 in Germany and the 400 in the UK.
90 Thus, there seems 
to be considerable room for more competitors in Japan.   
 
 
4. Health care 
 
Health care is a sector of vital importance in any economy. Not only does it account for a 
significant proportion of economic activity, especially in industrialized countries; it also has 
an important impact on social welfare. In Japan, total expenditure on health accounts for 7.9 
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  24percent of GDP. Although substantial, this figure is in the lower range of comparable OECD 
countries, indicating that Japan has managed to contain health care costs more effectively than 
other developed nations.
91  What is more, this has been achieved while providing 
comprehensive health coverage to all citizens and without the rationing seen, for example, in 
the U.K. And although health care is of course only one contributing factor, the Japanese 
today enjoy the highest life expectancy in the world. 
 
Yet, despite its apparent success, Japan’s health care sector has its fair share of problems. 
Peculiarities in the country’s health care system and health care regulation have fostered an 
environment in which competition from foreign firms in the pharmaceutical and medical 
devices industries was limited, leading Japan’s manufacturers to fall behind their international 
rivals. Other areas, in particular health care provision (i.e., doctors, hospitals, clinics), have 
been even more sheltered from competition, with the effect that, according to one study, the 
productivity of the Japanese health care system is only about 75 percent of the U.S. level.
92 
What is more, these problems are compounded by the demographic challenge – the aging and 
shrinking of the population – which is going to impose a growing burden on the national 
health care system and hence government finances. Already, the co-payment share of 
employees covered by the national health insurance has had to be successively raised from 10 
percent in the 1990s to 30 percent today. 
 
The health care sector makes an interesting case study of foreign direct investment in Japan 
for a number of reasons. First of all, it spans a number of subsectors with very different 
characteristics, regulatory regimes, and patterns of foreign participation. Potential areas to 
look at include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, medical diagnostics, blood products, and 
health care services. This section considers three of these: pharmaceuticals, medical 
equipment and health care services. Including two manufacturing industries and a service 
sector, these three categories are fairly representative of the entire health care spectrum.  
 
A glance at two of these sectors, drugs & medicine and medical services, for which separate 
data on the employment accounted for by foreign affiliates as a share of total employment are 
available (see Table 1) shows a stark contrast in the extent of foreign penetration: Together 
with the car industry, drugs & medicine is in fact the segment with the highest share of 
foreign employees of any industry in Japan. In contrast, in the medical services, health and 
hygiene segment, foreign companies are almost non-existent and account for less than 0.2 
percent of total employment in the sector. While this is not a sector that readily lends itself to 
foreign direct investment in any country, the figure for Japan is less than a tenth of that for the 
United States.  
 
The reasons for this contrast between the pharmaceutical industry and health care services are 
easy to find. Whereas foreign direct investment in the pharmaceuticals sector has been 
possible for decades, current regulations prohibit for-profit companies to provide health care 
services. The health care service sector therefore provides a useful illustration of a 
“sanctuary” where the absence of FDI is not the outcome of any discriminatory policies 
against foreign companies but rather the result of more general entry barriers that also inhibit 
the entry of domestic operators. This lack of competition in health care services – in areas 
where competition is appropriate – is an important factor contributing to the observed low 
productivity in Japan’s health care system.  
 
                                                 
91 Health expenditure amounts to only 7.7 percent of GDP in the U.K., but to 10.1 percent in France, 11.1 
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92 McKinsey Global Institute (2000). 
  25But it is not only in the area of services that the regulatory framework has had detrimental 
effects. Heavy regulation has also been responsible for delaying the introduction of new drugs 
and treatments developed overseas and for fostering pharmaceutical and medical devices 
industries that were largely inward looking. Regulatory and other changes in the 1990s since 
have made it much easier for foreign companies to introduce drugs in Japan and, as the 
following sections will show, the impact has been far-reaching.    
 
 
The pharmaceutical industry 
 
At first glance, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry seems to present a paradox. At almost US$60 
billion in 2004, the country’s drug market is the second-largest in the world, behind only that 
of the United States (ca. US$230 billion), and about twice as large as third-ranked 
Germany’s.
93 Japanese firms have long dominated their home market,
94 and given such a 
strong domestic demand base, one might expect Japan’s drug makers to be among the leading 
pharmaceutical companies in the world. Yet, not one Japanese firm ranks among the global 




account for less than 4 percent of global sales.
95 What is more, this figure obviously includes 
sales in Japan. The country’s export market share (out of all OECD countries) is smaller still 
and even shrinking, having fallen from 3.3 percent in 1997 to 2.1 percent in 2003.
96
 
Thus, unlike in the car or electronics industry, a large home market has not translated into a 
competitive advantage abroad. In fact, Japan has consistently run a trade deficit in 
pharmaceuticals, and this deficit has grown rapidly in recent years (see Figure 2). Furthermore, 
the dominant position of Japanese firms in their home market has been slipping in recent 
years: Still controlling 85 percent of the market in 1990, Japanese firms’ share shrank to less 
than two-thirds in 2004.
97 And while in 1990, no foreign firm made it into the top 10 in Japan 
and only one into the top 20, by 2004, four had broken into the top 10 and another three into 
the top 20 (see Table 4).  
 
 
Insert Figure 2, Table 4 
 
 
These figures highlight two major features Japan’s pharmaceutical industry: the dominance of 
domestic firms in their home market despite their lack of international competitiveness; and 
the inroads by foreign firms into the Japanese market in recent years. How this situation came 
about, and the role foreign direct investment plays in it, can only be properly understood in 
the context of the particular “ecosystem” in which the health care industries operate in 
Japan.
98 This ecosystem is the outcome of political interactions over the years among three 
key players: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Medical Association (JMA) 
representing 156,000 doctors (about 60 percent of all physicians in Japan), and the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MHW; now the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW). The 
                                                 
93 Figures from Scrip Magazine, “Growth, in moderation”, February 2005. 
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  26interplay of these three actors has given rise to a regulatory framework in which the special 
interests of the medical doctors represented by the JMA have often taken precedence over 
other considerations such as economic efficiency, the creation of internationally competitive 
health care industries, or the welfare of society as a whole.
99
 
Critically important elements of the ecosystem this situation has given rise to are the lack of 
separation (bungyo) between the prescription and dispensing of medication and the “doctor’s 
margin”: doctors both prescribe and dispense drug which they purchase from wholesalers at a 
discount from the official retail price. Since the Ministry of Health reimburses doctors for all 
drugs at the official retail price, doctors pocket the difference. This system presents doctors 
with a strong incentive to over-prescribe products – Japanese patients have been described as 
kusurizuke, or pickled in drugs – and had led to a rapid increase in pharmaceutical demand. In 
order to keep healthcare expenditure under check, the government therefore began in 1981 to 
steadily lower the reimbursement prices for drugs. Drug prices in Japan have fallen by 
roughly 5 percent a year as a result. Crucially, owing to health ministry regulation, it is prices 
for established products that drop rapidly, creating incentives for doctors to prescribe the 
latest and most expensive drugs and for pharmaceutical firms to proliferate many minor, 
imitative new drugs. As a result, product life cycles in Japan have been much shorter than in 
the United States, Britain or Germany, R&D resources have been fragmented rather than 
concentrated on a handful of important products, and Japan has produced few drugs with any 
likelihood of diffusion overseas.    
 
Another element of the ecosystem in which Japan’s pharmaceutical industry has had to 
operate and which explains its lack of competitiveness is the clinical trial system and drug 
approval procedures. Based on very different practices and standards as those found in the 
United States or European countries, results of clinical trials in Japan are “acceptable and 
respected almost nowhere else in the world.”
100 Japanese firms with global ambitions 
therefore have typically been forced to conduct clinical trials in the United States or in Europe; 
but lacking financial muscle and marketing know-how, most have chosen to license 
internationally successful drugs to foreign partners rather than selling them under their own 
brand name. At the same time, Japan until recently refused to accept clinical trial results from 
abroad.
101 Foreign firms wishing to introduce a product already being sold around the world 
therefore had to spend large sums of money and a lot of time (sometimes years) simply to 
replicate trials already conducted abroad. The effects have been detrimental both to Japan’s 
drug firms and to the country’s patients: hampered in their ability to compete overseas and 
largely insulated from international competition at home, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry 
became increasingly disconnected from advances abroad, while patients failed to benefit from 
many innovative drugs developed overseas.  
 
A final element that it is necessary to mention in this brief outline is the distribution system. 
Over 90 percent of drugs in Japan are distributed by wholesalers, and more than four-fifth of 
this share is directly dispensed by prescribing hospitals and doctors. Distribution thus is 
highly complex and fragmented and wholesale prices – which determine the “doctor’s 
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trial data here. The expert committee for Taxol never rejected foreign clinical trials because they were foreign, 
but rather because they were different from established Japanese practice.”   
  27margin”  – are directly negotiated between wholesalers and doctors, creating the need for 
large armies of distributors and salesmen. Few wholesalers provide national coverage and 
many are vertically linked with domestic drug manufacturers. (In fact, many Japanese drug 
firms evolved out of wholesalers.) The traditional ties between certain wholesalers and 
manufacturers have made it difficult in the past for other drugs makers – smaller Japanese as 
well as foreign ones – to gain access to doctors and most foreign firms operating in Japan 
have had to team up with one of the five large Japanese firms that used to dominate the 
wholesale network in the country.
102    
 
The lack of bungyo  (separation between prescription and dispensing) and the “doctor’s 
margin,” the health ministry’s reimbursement pricing scheme, the clinical trial system, the 
distribution system, and a host of other elements – it is this distinctive ecosystem that explains 
why Japan’s pharmaceutical firms are relatively uncompetitive internationally but still have 
dominated their home market. The ecosystem also explains why, by the mid-1990s, a 
significant “drug lag” had opened up between Japan and other developed countries, 
manifesting itself in the fact that a large number of global products, many of them significant 
innovations with important therapeutic effects, were not available in Japan.
103 Finally, it also 
explains why the market share of generic drugs – drugs that are exactly the same as a brand 
name drug but that anyone is allowed to produce since the original drug’s patent has expired – 
in Japan is so small. Until 1992, the initial reimbursement price for generic drugs was set at 
100 percent of the price of the original drug. Since then, reimbursement prices for generics 
have been successively lowered and now range from 15 to 70 percent of the original drug, 
with an average of around 50 percent.
104 Nevertheless, reimbursement prices for generics still 
remain considerably higher than in other comparable countries.
105 In any case, Japan’s over-
the-counter market is small and doctors, the main dispensers of drugs, face incentives to 
prescribe more expensive brand drugs rather than low cost generic alternatives. It is little 
surprise, then, that the market share of generics in Japan is only 12 percent (on a quantity 




The stage is now set to consider foreign companies’ role in Japan’s pharmaceutical sector and 
recent industry dynamics. The first thing to note is that foreign direct investment in the sector 
has been possible for decades.
107  In fact, part of the implicit protection of Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry was the requirement that firms wanting to sell drugs in Japan needed 
to have manufacturing facilities in the country. With takeovers, as in the rest of the economy, 
unheard of until the late 1990s, foreign direct investment typically took the form of joint 
ventures with Japanese partners. These provided foreign firms with access to local 
manufacturing expertise as well as help in navigating the complexities of the drug approval 
process and the distribution system. Given the relative backwardness of Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry, the overriding motive for investing in the country has been, and 
                                                 
102 Thomas (2001: 59-62).  
103 Thomas (2001), chapter 1. One indicator of this drug lag is that at the time Thomas wrote his study, 130 out 
of the 230 global drugs since 1985 were unavailable in Japan. One prominent example of a drug unavailable in 
Japan until only very recently that most of those familiar with Japan will be aware of is, of course, the 
contraceptive pill. Although used by millions of women worldwide, “the pill” was banned in Japan as a result of 
pressure by the Japan Medical Association (JMA). Abortion as a principal means of birth control represented a 
major source of income for Japan’s medical profession.  
104 Riku (2005). 
105 Bill Bishop, Director, Corporate Affairs, Wyeth K.K., interview on 7 October, 2005. 
106 Figures are for 2002. Source: JETRO (2005c). 
107 Merck, for example, having established a joint venture as early as 1954, gradually began building up a 
majority stake in its local partner, Banyu, twenty years ago. 
  28continues to be, access to the Japanese market for the sale of drugs developed in the United 
States or Europe – a fact that is clearly reflected in Japan’s persistent and growing trade 
deficit in pharmaceuticals shown in Figure 2.
108 Another avenue for overseas pharmaceutical 
firms to sell their products in Japan has been through licensing deals, and the distribution of 
foreign drugs used to be an important source of income for domestic firms.  
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, the status quo in Japan’s drugs industry began to 
crumble, thanks to regulatory changes that could be labeled Japan’s “pharmaceutical big 
bang.” Not only are firms selling drugs in Japan no longer required to have production 
facilities in the country. The government also started also started to introduce measures to 
simplify and accelerate the approval of marketing applications. Steps were taken to make the 
use of foreign clinical trial data easier and a new, better-staffed regulatory body, the 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA), was set up with the aim of reducing 
the review of drugs applications to less than 12 months.  
 
The implications of these regulatory steps are far-reaching. In effect largely removing the 
hurdles that had hitherto afforded Japanese firms a degree of protection, the measures have 
led to a rapid realignment in the industry. Simply by introducing drugs long established 
overseas, Western multinationals have been able to gain significant market share (see above) 
and earn a tidy profit – in some cases, thanks to the lack of competition from generics, even 
on products whose patents have already expired. As a result, even though the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market has more or less stagnated over the past decade or so as a result of the 
government’s reimbursement pricing policy, the same policy at present is providing foreign 
drug makers with ample profit opportunities.  
 
The new opportunities have also led to an increased interest in investing in Japan. In line with 
patterns observed in other sectors, acquisitions of Japanese companies became a common 
mode for foreign companies to establish or expand their presence in Japan. In addition to the 
headline cases presented in Table 5, many Western firms are buying out former joint ventures 
with domestic manufacturers in order to increase the recognition of their brands.
109 These 
developments indicate that foreign drug makers no longer need their local counterparts. In 
fact, they go hand in hand with another important trend: foreign pharmaceutical firms have 
been aggressively expanding their own sales forces in the country in order to sidestep the 
complex distribution system, obviating the need to pay distribution fees to local rivals, 
providing greater efficiency, and further enhancing brand recognition. In early 2004, the top 
five foreign pharmaceutical firms, led by Pfizer from the U.S. and AstraZeneca from the U.K., 





Insert Table 5 
  
 
Meanwhile, Japanese companies are struggling. Not only are they losing their licensing 
business because Western firms increasingly sell their drugs on their own; there is also little 
they can do to respond to the onslaught of competition in a stagnating market. Because of the 
                                                 
108 It should be noted, though, that Japan runs a surplus in the technology balance of trade in the sector to the 
tune of ¥99.5 billion (2003), roughly 20 percent the size of its deficit in the merchandise balance of trade.  
109 An example is Wyeth’s gradual acquisition of Takeda’s stake in their joint venture in Japan, Wyeth K.K. 
110  IMS Global Insight, “Sumos wrestle into Japan.” Online: <http://www.imshealth.com/web/content/ 
0,3148,64576068_63872702_70261002_70960269,00.html> (accessed 7 December 2005). 
  29nature of the domestic ecosystem, Japanese companies have invested less in R&D than their 
foreign peers and have few promising products in the “pipeline.” What is more, despite 
dwindling profits, they have long resisted consolidation even as their European and American 
rivals have grown bigger through mergers and acquisitions and devoted ever larger sums to 
R&D. However, this began to change in 2005 with the merger of Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical 
and Fujisawa Pharmaceutical to form Astellas Pharma, followed by the announcement of 
similar tie-ups between Sankyo and Daiichi Pharma as well as Dainippon Pharmaceutical and 
Sumitomo Pharmaceutical. Yet, doubts remain whether these mergers will create sufficient 
synergies to overcome underlying weaknesses in the development of blockbuster drugs and 
create sufficient financial muscle to compete on a global scale.
111 Moreover, the alliances are 
seen partially as preemptive moves in anticipation of regulatory changes taking effect in 2007 
that will make it easier for foreign companies to acquire Japanese firms using stock swaps.
112  
 
Overall, the outlook for most Japanese drug manufacturers is bleak. At best a handful are 
expected to be able to compete internationally, and in order to do so, they have to become  
much more globally oriented, quickly. Many already have set up R&D operations and conduct 
clinical trials abroad in order to tap the all-important U.S. market. What is more, some of the 
larger players, led by Takeda, are in the process of expanding their sales forces abroad in 
order to avoid missing out on overseas profits on drugs sold under license, as has happened in 
the past.
113 Medium-sized companies, on the other hand, are likely to find it much more 
difficult to survive. If not swallowed by a bigger domestic or a foreign firm, they may quit the 
brand-name drug business and instead concentrate on generic drugs or drug manufacturing 
services for other companies. As in other industries, there is a growing division of labor 
among increasingly specialized firms, and liberalization, begun in 1997 and continuing today, 
is gradually removing the barriers for contract sales organizations, site management 
organizations, contract research organizations and, most recently, drug manufacturing service 
companies – specialized companies which first appeared in Europe and the United States as 
early as the 1970s and 1980s.
114  
 
Another area in which the presence of Western pharmaceutical firms is clearly being felt is 
distribution. Bypassing the traditional distribution system by boosting their own sales forces, 
foreign drug makers have contributed to the deteriorating profitability of traditional 
wholesaler, forcing these into mergers and tie-ups. As a result, the number of member 
companies of the Japan Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Association (JPWA) has shrunk by 70 
percent from 486 in 1985 to 137 in 2005.
115 Merger and reorganization activity accelerated 
around 1999, leaving behind only four major drug wholesalers with their various subsidiaries 
today.
116   
 
Japan’s pharmaceutical sector is at present undergoing a major transition. Leading a sheltered 
existence in the country’s idiosyncratic ecosystem until the late 1990s, Japanese drug 
manufacturers failed to participate in many of the trends that have been shaping the industry 
                                                 
111Bill Bishop, Director, Corporate Affairs, Wyeth K.K., interview on 7 October, 2005. Also see Pharmiweb.com, 
“Mergers emerge in Japan,” 29 November 2005. Online: <http://www.pharmiweb.com/features/ 
feature.asp?ROW_ID=698> (accessed 7 December 2005) 
112 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, “Mergers in Japan help firms retain own products,” 29 April 2005. Online: 
<http://www.nature.com/news/2005/050425/pf/nrd1744_pf.html> (accessed 7 December 2005). 
113 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, “Mergers in Japan help firms retain own products,” 29 April 2005. Online: 
<http://www.nature.com/news/2005/050425/pf/nrd1744_pf.html> (accessed 7 December 2005). 
114 JETRO (2005c). 
115 Figures from the JPWA website: <http://www.jpwa.or.jp/jpwa/members-e.html> (accessed 8 December, 
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  30elsewhere. However, as a result of the regulatory reforms initiated over the past six or seven 
years, Japan’s vast market has become a battleground for the world’s foremost pharmaceutical 
companies, exposing domestic manufacturers for the first time to the full forces of global 
competition. The presence of foreign companies in Japan thus is a key factor underlying the 
current transformation of the industry. At least three major trends can be distinguished. The 
first is globalization and can be seen not only in the growing market share of foreign 
companies in Japan but also in Japanese firms’ efforts to expand R&D efforts and sales forces 
overseas and build market recognition.
117 The second is consolidation. The number of 
pharmaceutical companies in Japan peaked at 1,646 in 1993 but then declined to 1,062 in 
2003 as a result of market exits and mergers and acquisitions.
118 Market concentration has 
also gradually been rising, with the sales share of the top 5 drug manufacturers increasing 
from 21.3 percent in 1990 to 28.6 percent in 2003.
119 The third trend, finally, is the increase in 
outsourcing of R&D, manufacturing, sales and site management, leading to growth in the 
number of firms specializing in these activities. 
 
The most important issue from a Japanese perspective is whether the industry can transform 
itself quickly enough to ensure its continued existence. The scale of the challenge is 
formidable. According to one observer, “[n]othing short of a complete merger of every 
existing Japanese drug firm into a monolith would yield a true competitor to foreign firms 
such as Merck or Glaxo.”
120 Others argue it is difficult to imagine how the industry can 
survive in the long-run without significant further consolidation and partnership with foreign 
manufacturers.
121 Foreign firms thus look set to play a key role in shaping the future of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.  
 
A final important point that is quite unrelated to any immediate economic considerations but 
that forms part and parcel of the presence of foreign firms in Japan is the increase in “product 
variety” and “consumer choice” they bring with them. In the case of pharmaceuticals, these 
are particularly valuable gains given that the product in question are drugs which may have a 
vital impact on patients’ well-being. And these gains are all the greater because of the size of 
the gap that had opened up between the drugs available in Japan and overseas, which may 
have deprived patients of potentially life-saving medication available abroad but not at home  
 
 
Medical devices  
 
In many regards, the situation in the medical devices sector resembles that in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Japanese firms dominate their domestic market but are relatively 
weak in the international arena, and their position at home appears increasingly vulnerable: 
Domestic firms account for 60 percent of sales in Japan, but the country’s largest medical 
device makers, Olympus and Terumo, rank only 12
th and 13
th in the world. Japan also has a 
large and growing deficit in the trade in medical devices, with imports more than twice as 
large as exports (see Figure 3). What is more, foreign (that is, American) firms already 
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  31account for eight out of the thirteen leading firms by sales in the country.
122 As in the case of 
drugs, Japanese firms have been ill-prepared to cope with the increase in competition that 
gradual deregulation in the medical devices market as part of the wider health care reform 
effort has brought about.  
 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
 
This lack in competitiveness again is the result of the ecosystem in which the industry has had 
to operate in Japan. Regulations are one factor. Like drugs, medical devices require the 
approval of the health ministry, and the Japanese environment is generally considered to be 
very restrictive, conservative, and highly regulated.
123 Companies – domestic and foreign 
alike – have often complained about the cost and time required for product registrations, 
which in some instances has taken so long that by the time products were approved, they were 
already outdated,
124 and it seems reasonable to assume that lengthy approval procedures have 
acted as a brake on domestic innovation.
125 What is more, approvals do appear to have taken 
longer for foreign than for domestic products, although, as in the case of drugs, this may be 
less due to any bias against foreign products or clinical evidence per se and more due to 
differences with established Japanese practice and the fact that applications by domestic 




But in addition to restrictive regulation, there are other unfavorable factors which are likely to 
have put Japanese manufacturers at a disadvantage. One of these is that until the 1980s, 
Japan’s population was relatively young when compared with those of the United States or 
Europe, meaning that the demand for medical devices for age-related conditions (such as 
pacemakers) was limited.
127 Another is that Japan lags far behind the United States and other 
countries in the adoption of new technology in the medical profession, partly as a result of 
doctors’ reluctance to replace time-tested techniques with high-tech equipment.
128 Yet another 
reason is that Japanese firms are reluctant to get involved in medical devices used in situations 
where patients’ life may be in danger (again, pacemakers are an example) for fear of litigation 
and damage to the firm’s reputation.
129
 
Heavy regulation, combined with the peculiarities of the Japanese market (such as the 
difficulties involved in negotiating the multilayered distribution system and the need to 
provide the free technical support Japanese customers expect) have afforded domestic medical 
equipment manufacturers some shelter from international competition in their home market. 
As a result, Japanese firms dominate the domestic market for relatively mature, standardized 
                                                 
122 Based on unpublished data obtained from the Japan Medical Devices Manufacturers Association (JMED). 
123 See, e.g., Pacific Bridge Medical, “Opportunities in Japan’s Medical Device Market”, August 2001. Online: 
<http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/html/JapanAugust01.htm> (accessed 8 December, 2005). 
124 Takeshi Fujiwara, President, Gambro K.K., interview on 30 June, 2005. 
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<http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/html/JapanAugust01.htm> (accessed 8 December, 2005). 
129 Akihiro Yamamoto, Managing Director, Japan Medical Devices Manufacturers Association (JMED), 
interview on 12 September, 2005; Takeshi Fujiwara, President, Gambro K.K., interview on 30 June, 2005. 
  32products in which manufacturing quality and after-sales services are the decisive competitive 
parameters. Prime examples of such products are dialysis equipment and blood purification 
products, in which domestic production accounts for more than 80 percent of domestic 
shipments. On the other hand, imports account for 70 percent or more of total domestic 
shipment in the case of generic catheters, orthopedic implants, and wound treatment materials 
and for more than 90 percent in the case of surgical implants and pacemakers and related 
products. Out of 13 categories in total, domestic products occupy a market share of more than 
50 percent in five, while imports predominate in the remaining eight.
130
 
These patterns go hand in hand with another characteristic of Japan’s medical devices 
industry: compared with  their international counterparts, domestic firms tend to be 
comparatively small and spend little on R&D.
131  Of course, this does not mean that Japan has 
no globally competitive firms in this sector. A notable case is Olympus, which (in 2001) 
commanded a 68 percent share in the global market for endoscopes.
132 But Olympus is the 
exception that proves the rule and its strength in the medical business largely rests on 
electronic and optical technologies honed in other industries. 
 
For foreign companies, Japan is again primarily attractive as a market. While most 
multinationals in the industry have established themselves in Japan, the majority concentrate 
on the import and sale of products manufactured abroad and on after-sales services. Of course, 
this does not mean that foreign firms do not pursue other activities in the country. A number 
of foreign firms have been in Japan for decades and have gradually expanded their operations. 
Becton Dickinson Japan (BDJ), for example, established as a liaison office in 1971 and set up 
its first manufacturing plant and distribution center in 1987; activities in Japan were further 
expanded 2002 to include R&D.
133  Other examples include Baxter, which also invested in 
manufacturing, and Boston Scientific Japan (BSJ), which has set up a training facility in order 
to teach doctors how to use the company’s products.  
 
Foreign companies’ role in the Japan medical devices industry is only bound to grow as 
deregulation and the streamlining of product approvals make it easier for them to sell their 
products. The outlook for domestic firms, on the other hand, is grim. Already lacking in 
international competitiveness, Japanese firms face the added disadvantage of operating in an 
environment that is missing many of the ingredients necessary for innovation in this field.
134  
Japanese patients (and taxpayers), finally, are likely to benefit from the better treatment 
options and potential cost savings afforded by the availability of a greater range of more 






                                                 
130 Based on unpublished data obtained from the Japan Medical Devices Manufacturers Association (JMED). 
131 According to unpublished data obtained from the Japan Medical Devices Manufacturers Association, a 
comparison of a sample of Japan and American firms shows that R&D expenditure for the former is equivalent 
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132 Based on unpublished data obtained from the Japan Medical Devices Manufacturers Association (JMED). 
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  33Health care services 
 
The provision of health care services is predominantly a local industry and foreign 
participation is rare in all countries. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to briefly examine this 
sector as it provides a vivid example of a “sanctuary” where government regulations, by 
restricting entry more generally, act as a barrier to foreign direct investment. What is more, 
the sector provides at least one prominent case of a foreign company that is keenly interested 
in expanding into Japan, but is barred from doing so by current regulations.   
 
A key element of these regulations, which have grown out of the ecosystem described above, 
concerns the role of for-profit operators in the provision of medical services. As in other 
developed countries, for-profit operators in Japan are allowed to offer peripheral services 
(clinical tests, clerical services, meal services to patients, etc.). However, in contrast with the 
United States and European countries, they are effectively banned from providing the core 
medical services of diagnosis and treatment (Table 6). As a result, while in Japan, only 0.7 
percent of hospitals are operated by for-profit providers, the equivalent share in the U.S. is 
15.1 percent, that in Germany is 19.9 percent, and that in France even 41.6 percent.
135 
Coupled with other elements of the regulatory framework, such as reimbursement for each 
procedure and on a per diem basis for hospital stays rather than a flat fee for a particular 
diagnosed condition, this ban has led to a proliferation of small, unprofitable, and highly 
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Recognizing the potential gains of greater competition, patient choice, and diversification in 
funding, the Japanese government has recently begun experimenting with allowing companies 
to manage hospitals in “special zones” if they offer “advanced medical care” in designated 
fields.
137 However,  because such services are not covered by the national health insurance, no 
such hospitals have sprung up to date. What is more, once non-reimbursed services reach a 
threshold level of 50,000 procedures, they would be eligible for reimbursement. Thus, any 
service provider in the “special zones” that is successful would lose its market, because others 
could offer the service.
138 The government is also trying to attract foreign direct investment in 
peripheral medical services in showcase medical industry development zones such as the 
“Finland Health and Welfare Center” in Sendai and the “Kobe Medical Industry Development 
Project”, although the services.
139 Crucially, however, the ban on corporate ownership of 
hospitals and clinics outside the experimental special zones remains firmly in place.  
 
Although health care services represent a sector that is much less internationalized than other 
service industries, a number of global companies in this field do exist. A case in point is 
Fresenius Medical Care from Germany, the world leader in renal care that both manufactures 
dialysis products and runs dialysis clinics around the world. As of September 2005, the 
company was treating 130,400 patients in 1,670 clinics in North and Latin America, Europe, 
                                                 
135 JETRO (2002: 5). 
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137 JETRO (2005d). 
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  34Africa, and the Asia/Pacific region.
140 With approximately 250,000 dialysis patients, Japan is 
the biggest dialysis market in Asia/Pacific and the second-largest in the world, and Fresenius 
is naturally keen to invest in the country. In fact, the company has been in Japan since 1990 
and today has offices on all four main islands of the archipelago. It also has two 
manufacturing facilities – one in a joint venture with a local company – for the production of 
dialysis products, which are gaining in market share.
141  Obviously, Fresenius is eager to also 




Renal care service are just one example of treatments where the specialization and economies 
of scale of corporate providers could generate substantial productivity gains and cost-savings 
in the Japanese health care system.
143 Other areas in which allowing corporate ownership 
could contribute to cost, productivity, and quality improvements in Japanese health care 
services are the outsourcing of radiation therapy, rehabilitation care, telecare and other health 
care services that are repetitive and/or pose little risk to patients.
144 Finally, for-profit 
providers could help to give rise to a cadre of professional hospital managers (as, for example, 




Given the many other distortions in Japan’s health care system, lifting the ban on corporate 
ownership of hospitals and clinics would, of course, only be part of the answer. What is more, 
even in the United States and most Western European countries, less than one-fifth of 
hospitals are operated by for-profit providers and foreign participation in the sector is low. 
Foreign direct investment in medical services therefore would at best account for a small 
portion of the overall market in Japan, although there is potential in certain specialized areas, 
as the Fresenius example illustrates. A final consideration to take into account is that it is 
often the corporate sector in which innovations occur and in the absence of FDI, Japan risks 
falling (further) behind in the introduction of effective and cost-reducing treatments 
developed overseas, to the detriment of the country’s patients and taxpayers.   
 
 
5. Other sectors 
 
There are of course a considerable number of other sectors which would have made 
instructive in-depth case studies. The chemical industry, business services, but in particular 
the telecommunications and the wholesale & retail sectors have experienced large inflows of  
FDI around the turn of the millennium and the growing presence of foreign companies has 
contributed to important structural changes in these sectors. At the same time, other industries, 
                                                 
140 Source: Fresenius Medical Care, patient care statistics. Online: <http://www.fmc-ag.com/internet/fmc/fmcag/ 
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  35such as the utilities sector, which has seen considerable M&A activity elsewhere in the world 
in recent years following deregulation, have received little FDI, largely as a result of market 
entry barriers. Although these industries cannot be considered in detail here, it is nevertheless 




Wholesale and Retail  
 
Ranging from the large-scale outlets of retailers such as Toys “R” Us and Costco to the 
consumer temples of Western luxury brands in the fashionable areas of Tokyo, retail probably 
represents the sector in which the presence of foreign companies is most visible to the 
ordinary consumer. In contrast with many of the other sectors, retail has seen a steady inflow 
of foreign direct investment since the 1980s, although this segment, too, witnessed a rapid 
increase toward the end of the 1990s. One reason is that deregulation started earlier than in 
most other sectors. The Large-Scale Retail Store Law, enacted in 1973 and intended to protect 
small retailers from the incursion of larger retail stores, was amended in 1992 and again in 
1994 to facilitate the establishment of large retail outlets.  
 
A pioneering case of foreign direct investment in the sector was the opening of a gigantic 
store (by Japanese standards) of 3000m
2 in Ibaraki prefecture near Tokyo by the American 
toy retailer Toys “R” Us in 1991. The company has since grown into Japan’s largest toy 
retailer with more than 160 stores (as of 2005) all over the country. Like many other sectors in 
Japan, the toy industry used to be characterized by a multi-layered distribution structure in 
which manufacturers distributed their products through wholesalers to retailers. Toys “R” Us 
broke with this practice and employed a central buying system for large-lot purchases direct 
from the manufacturer, passing on the savings to consumers through lower retail prices.  
 
Other foreign retailers and wholesalers have since followed suit. In addition to similarly 
circumventing the complex distribution system, a number of these have introduced retail 
business concepts new to Japan, such as membership warehouse clubs (Costco), hypermarkets 
(Carrefour) and membership food wholesalers (Metro). However, while some foreign retailers 
have prospered in Japan, others have already exited again, including OfficeMax, Sephora, and 
Boots, typically because of strategic mistakes and/or a misjudgment of the Japanese market. 
The most prominent case of these failures is probably Carrefour, which, having entered Japan 
only in 2001, sold its eight hypermarkets in the country to a Japanese retailer in 2004. 
 
Despite failures such as these, foreign retailers have triggered a transformation of Japan’s 
retail and distribution sector. Domestic rivals have been forced to streamline their own 
purchasing operations, and although even today, few directly do business with manufacturers, 
there has been a clear trend toward consolidation in the wholesale sector as a result of 
increased competition.
146 In addition, superstores have become a common sight in Japan, and 
even though their number has stagnated in recent years following a rapid increase during the 
1990s, the sales area per store has continue to rise.
147 As a result, productivity in the retail 
sector, which according to one study toward the end of the 1990s only reached 50 percent of 
the U.S. level, is likely to have increased.  
 
Other areas in which foreign retailers have had a significant impact on the Japanese market is 
in the rise of specialty chain stores – examples of investment cases, in addition to Toys “R” 
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147 JETRO (2004: 13). 
  36Us, include Sports Authority and Office Depot – and in the luxury segment. In the latter, 
European and American firms such as Louis Vuitton, Chanel, Prada and Coach have gained a 
virtually iconic status and their products and stores have become an integral part of Japan’s 
fashion and architectural landscapes. 
 
Today, there is a long list of foreign retailers doing business in Japan that demonstrate that it 
is possible to be successful in the country. A closer look at the failures (whose number is also 
not insubstantial) on the other hand typically shows that the reasons are to be found in 
strategic management errors and a lack of understanding of the Japanese market.  The retail 
sector thus is likely to continue to attract considerable amounts of foreign direct investment in 
the future, for the simple reason that few globally operating retailers can ignore a market the 





Having received virtually no foreign direct investment until the late 1990s, the 
telecommunications industry was one of the key drivers of the boom in inward FDI in Japan 
around the turn of the millennium. Investments were driven by two coinciding developments. 
The first was global consolidation in the telecommunications sector. For example, in 1999, 
Vodafone of the U.K. acquired AirTouch Communications of the U.S. in a deal worth US$60 
billion and then, in the following year, Germany’s Mannesmann in what was the world’s 
largest corporate merger in history worth US$183 billion. Other large deals at that time   
include France Telecom’s acquisition of Britain’s Orange (worth US$46 billion) and 
Deutsche Telekom’s purchase of Britain’s One 2 One (worth US$14 billion).  
 
The second important development spurring FDI in Japan’s telecommunications sector was 
deregulation. In WTO negotiations concluded in 1997, Japan had agreed to remove all foreign 
investment limitations on Type I carriers (carriers using their own infrastructure) except for 
NTT and KDD. Taking effect in 1998, the changes paved the way for the country to 
participate in the global FDI boom in the sector. Inflows jumped from ¥3.3 billion (about 
US$27 million at the exchange rate of the time) in 1997 to ¥750.8 billion (approximately 
US$6.8 billion) in 2000. Although FDI in the sector, in line with global trends subsided, in 
2002 and 2003, it was strong again in 2004. 
 
What is interesting about the telecommunications industry case is that the FDI trends in this 
sector have been almost exclusively shaped by one case: the acquisition of Japan Telecom, 
first by British Telecom and AT&T and then by Vodafone.
148 What is more, in the second 
prominent, though considerably smaller, FDI case of that period, the takeover of International 
Digital Communications (IDC) by Cable & Wireless,  the British company has since 
withdrawn from Japan, selling its stake in IDC to Softbank in 2004. Although, also in 2004, 
the private equity group Carlyle acquired a 60 percent stake in personal handy phone operator 
DDI Pocket from KDDI, these developments leave Vodafone as the only foreign phone 
company with significant operations in the Japanese market.
149  
 
                                                 
148 It is also largely the Vodafone case that is responsible for the recovery in FDI inflows in this sector in 2004 
following the retrenchment in 2002 and 2003. In the summer of 2004, Vodafone increased its stake in its 
Japanese affiliate in a transaction worth US$ 4 billion. See JETRO (2005f: 18). 
149 There are also a number of other foreign companies operating in Japan, but these only provide small-scale 
services to local offices of their compatriot firms. 
  37A further interesting point to note is that even Vodafone, the world’s largest mobile phone 
operator, has met with only mixed success in the country. The acquisition of J-Phone in 2001 
at a stroke made the company the third largest mobile phone operator in Japan by number of 
subscribers. Yet, Vodafone’s subscriber numbers have stagnated in recent years (see Figure 4), 
while those of its closest rivals, NTT DoCoMo and KDDI (au) have continued to rise. Since 
hitting a peak of 17.4 percent in the summer of 2003, Vodafone’s market share subsequently 
slipped to 16.0 percent at the end of 2005.  
 
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
 
Vodafone’s difficulties in Japan are most likely the result of a combination of factors. First of 
all, Japan’s mobile phone industry today is generally considered to be a year or two ahead of 
the rest of the world (with the exception of Korea). Any foreign entrant thus would face a 
considerable challenge to compete in a market as advanced as Japan’s. A second factor is that 
the way in which the Japanese mobile phone industry operates differs in important ways from 
patterns found in Europe and the United States. Whereas in Europe and the United States, 
customers tend to feel loyal to handset-makers rather than providers (a fact encouraged by 
legislation to make mobile phone numbers “portable”), mobile phone operators in Japan have 
considerably greater power. Working closely with handset makers and selling their handsets 
under their own brands, it is the providers that determine the features and functions mobile 
phones offer. Able to roll out its third-generation (3G) networks and handsets in Japan only 
much later than NTT DoCoMo and KDDI, this delay has lost the company customers to its 
domestic competitors, especially since it was compounded by a third factor: In an attempt to 
drive down handset prices, Vodafone introduced handsets that were similar to those in the rest 
of the world, but offered far fewer features than rival models offered by NTT DoCoMo and 
KDDI.
150 Thus, a strategic management mistake appears to have compounded the challenges 
posed by the technology gap and the idiosyncratic market structure. 
 
A possible fourth factor which may have contributed not only Vodafone’s travails but also the 
withdrawal of Cable & Wireless and the absence of any other foreign players in Japan is the 
role of government regulations and the dominant position of the former state monopoly, NTT. 
The European Business Community in Japan (EBC), for example, complains that fixed-line 
interconnection charges in Japan are much higher than in the rest of the world and that NTT 
engages in anti-competitive behavior.
151 However, if such allegations are justified and, if so, 
to what extent they put foreign operators at a disadvantage, is difficult to assess.  
 
Even though Vodafone has only met with limited success in Japan to date, the company’s 
investment in Japan has certainly not been without wider repercussions. For Vodafone itself, 
the aim of investing in Japan was not only to expand its customer base, but to learn from 
being exposed to the world’s most advanced mobile phone market and gain access to J-
Phone’s technical knowledge. In this respect, the deal appears to have been a success: 
Technology developed by J-Phone has, for example, served as the basis for Vodafone’s 
cellular internet service, Vodafone live!, which the company has since introduced in other 
markets around the world.
152  
 
                                                 
150 The Economist, “Not so big in Japan”, 30 September 2004; The New York Times, “A major backfire in Japan 
deflates Vodafone’s one-size-fits-all strategy”, 5 September 2005. 
151 European Business Community in Japan (2004). 
152 Kushida (2005); The Economist, “Not so big in Japan”, 30 September 2004. 
  38Vodafone is also helping to reshape Japan’s handset industry and market, in which NTT 
DoCoMo used to call all the shots. Working with a select group of manufacturers, NTT 
DoCoMo wielded considerable influence over the terms on which these manufacturers could 
sell the same handsets to other providers.
153 While this would have put Vodafone at a distinct 
disadvantage, the British company was able to win over newcomers like Sharp, Sanyo, and 
Toshiba that were not part of the in-group with NTT DoCoMo to collaborate with it in the 
development of Vodafone-specific handsets. It was able to so because of the access to 
overseas markets that it could offer to these manufacturers, substantially boosting their export 
sales.
154 Vodafone has also introduced foreign handsets into the Japanese market, although 
with limited success. Thus, previously largely isolated from the rest of the world, thanks to 
Vodafone, Japan’s market for handsets is gradually becoming more international, with both 
more Japanese models being sold abroad and more overseas models being sold in Japan. 
 
Whether Vodafone can turn its Japanese venture into a success remains yet to be seen. While 
in early 2005, there even were rumors that Vodafone might withdraw from Japan,
155 recent 
news have been more positive. On the whole, it is difficult to gauge Vodafone’s longer-term 
prospects and impact. Japan’s mobile phone industry has a considerable lead over the rest of 
the world, but this lead is closely associated with the power of mobile operators in the country 
and the proprietary technologies they develop in cooperation with handset makers. Outside of 
their own country, Japan’s mobile operators have so far failed to significantly capitalize on 
their technological advantage.
156 Vodafone thus at present occupies unique position as the 
only company that has both a strong global presence and a solid foothold in Japan. 
 
 
6. Synthesis and conclusion 
 
The preceding case studies have shown that although the degree of market penetration by 
foreign-affiliated firms varies across industries, there are by now a considerable number of 
sectors in which their impact on the Japanese business “landscape” is highly visible. The most 
dramatic instance of this perhaps is the stunning turn-around at Nissan following the 
acquisition by Renault. But, as the analyses of the financial and the health care sectors have 
shown, even where there are no such showcase examples, the presence of foreign 
multinationals has had an effect on their respective industries and beyond.  
 
In order to synthesize the findings presented above, it is useful to consider the impact of 
foreign companies from five different angles. The first of these concerns foreign firms’ effect 
on the degree of competition in their respective industries. In this context, it is important to 
note that an important reason for the stagnation of the Japanese economy since the early 
1990s has been the disappointingly low rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, one of 
the underlying causes of which has been the lack of competition in a wide range of sectors.
157 
By contributing to greater competition, foreign firms force domestic competitors to “shape 
up” and raise their productivity if they want to survive. In the case studies, the revival of 
Nissan and the growing market share of foreign insurers and pharmaceutical firms provide 
clear examples of how foreign companies are turning up the heat on their domestic rivals.  
                                                 
153 Kushida (2002). 
154 Kushida (2005). 
155 See, e.g., BusinessWeek, “Vodafone’s bad connection in Japan”, 21 February 2005.  
156 NTT DoCoMo, for example, has tried to popularize its “i-mode” wireless media platform abroad, but has 
found fewer subscribers than Vodafone Live!. 
157 See Paprzycki and Fukao (2004) for details. 
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The exposure to global best practice they provide is the second angle from which to consider 
the impact of foreign companies. Apart from simply raising the number of competitors in a 
particular industry, foreign multinationals typically also bring with them business expertise 
and know-how honed in often more advanced and/or competitive markets overseas. Again, 
the case studies provide a wide array of examples, ranging from purchasing practices and 
financial operations at Nissan via portfolio modeling, risk management, and product 
development skills techniques and skills at foreign investment banks to the R&D capabilities 
of foreign pharmaceutical firms. In each of these cases, exposure to global best practice has 
elicited some sort of response by Japanese firms. In the car industry (as in many other sector), 
there has been a greater emphasis on profitability; in the financial sector, domestic banks have 
copied products developed by foreign competitors and have become active in areas such as 
project finance and derivatives trading; and in the pharmaceutical industry, the introduction in 
Japan of foreign firms’ global blockbuster drugs has forced domestic companies to strengthen 
their R&D, clinical trials, and marketing efforts overseas. 
 
Foreign firms’ contribution to the range of products and services available in Japan represents 
the third angle from which to consider their impact. Here, too, the case studies provide 
numerous examples, ranging from the goods and shopping experience provided by European 
and American luxury goods makers to previously unavailable third-sector insurance products 
such as cancer, nursing care and specialized medical care insurance. In addition, foreign 
investment banks have provided corporate customers with specialized financial services 
helping them to restructure their finances, while banks such as Citibank offer distinct retail 
services such as 24-hour ATM machines and longer opening hours. 
 
A fourth angle from which to view the role of foreign firms is in terms of their impact on 
industry structures. In this area, the case studies contain a number of examples where the 
impact so far has been rather limited, such as in the telecommunications industry or the 
banking sector, where, with the notable exception of investment banking, foreign financial 
institutions have to date failed to make significant inroads. But in other sectors, the impact has 
been substantial. In the car industry, Renault’s acquisition of Nissan was followed by a wider 
reorganization of the company’s supplier network, opening the door to further foreign entrants. 
In the insurance, wholesale & retail, and pharmaceutical sectors, foreign companies were the 
first to overhaul or by-pass established distribution channels – moves that domestic rivals are 
beginning to follow and that have triggered a consolidation in the wholesale & retail as well 
as pharmaceutical distribution sectors. But the clearest evidence of the impact on industry 
structures can probably be found in the pharmaceutical sector, where the onslaught of 
competition from foreign drugs makers has set in motion a consolidation process among 
domestic manufacturers that is likely to accelerate in the coming years.  
 
The fifth angle, finally, from which to examine the role of foreign multinationals in Japan is 
with regard to employment practices. Although it is hazardous to generalize from just one 
case, the Nissan example conforms with the widespread notion that foreign firms tend to be 
more willing to lay off workers when this is necessary. Foreign firms also tend to break with 
the traditional Japanese seniority-based system and instead rely on merit-based promotions 
and remuneration. Examples in the case studies illustrating this include again Nissan and the 
investment banks. Furthermore, although it would again be hasty to draw any general 
conclusions from this without more broad-based evidence, the insurance sector provides an 
example where foreign companies are leading the way toward greater professionalism by 
retraining staff and hiring personnel with experience in sales, a move that is gradually 
followed by domestic rivals. On the other hand, in the banking sector, despite moves to more 
  40meritocratic pay schemes in some domestic financial institutions, they provide no match for 
the high salaries paid by foreign investment banks.  
 
Another more general trend to which foreign companies are contributing is greater flexibility 
in employment practices and the labor market as a whole. Whereas only ten years ago, foreign 
firms often found it difficult to recruit personnel, working for a foreign company has gained 
in popularity in recent years and there is, in fact, a growing number of firms, both Japanese 
and foreign-owned, that specialize in recruitment services for foreign companies. Two of the 
industries considered here – the financial and the pharmaceutical/medical sector – are among 
the busiest for such recruitment consultancies.
158 Thus, “Western style” employment practices 
are spreading, and although there are other, structural reasons for this and it is consequently 
difficult to gauge the extent to which foreign firms are responsible, their growing presence is 
certainly playing a role.  
 
A final question that it is worth briefly considering is what determines the degree of 
penetration by and impact of foreign companies in a particular industry. Although the number 
of case studies presented here is clearly insufficient for a rigorous analysis, they do allow 
some conjectures. Obviously, FDI is absent in sectors where regulatory entry barriers remain 
(such as health care service). Apart from that, one factor determining the degree of foreign 
penetration appears to be the relative importance of “local knowledge” versus “global 
capabilities.” In the banking sector, for instance, foreign penetration remains low in areas 
where local knowledge, such as access to clients through long-term relationships, is important. 
On the other hand, in the area of investment banking, where global capabilities prevail over 
the advantages of long-term relationships, foreign penetration is much higher. Similarly, in 
the pharmaceutical industry, foreign penetration remained low as long as local knowledge – 
the ability to navigate the complex drug approval process – outweighed the importance of 
global R&D and marketing capabilities, but increased rapidly as regulatory changes 
simplifying the drug approval process tipped the balance the other way.  
 
Other obvious factors are the strength of domestic companies in an industry and the 
international competitiveness of that industry more generally. Japan’s insurance and 
pharmaceutical industries for different reasons are both relatively weak in international 
comparison, making it easy for foreign firms to gain market share through superior products. 
In contrast, Japan leads the world in mobile telecommunications, and foreign firms (basically, 
Vodafone) have struggled to make a large impact. In the case of this industry, the high degree 
of concentration and NTT position as the former state monopoly probably have been 
exacerbating factors. The one sector that does not neatly fit into this pattern is the car industry. 
On the one hand one of Japan’s strongest industries with one of the strongest companies in the 
world (Toyota), this sector also has the highest penetration of foreign firms of any industry.  
 
A final observation is that deregulation (such as in the financial and the telecommunications 
sector) and regulatory reform (such as in the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries) 
clearly have played an important role in spurring foreign direct investment. However, no clear 
pattern can be discerned that would suggest that foreign firms have been more successful, or 
less, in newly deregulated than in other industries. While they certainly have been very 
successful in the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries, the same cannot be said for 
the telecommunications sector.  
 
                                                 
158 Richard Mason, Associate Director, JAC Japan, interview on 19 May 2005. 
  41The case studies presented here have demonstrated that foreign direct investment in Japan, 
even at its current low levels,
159 is playing a significant role in reshaping the country’s 
economy. Although greater competition may be painful for some segments of the economy 
(such as the country’s pharmaceutical and medical devices industries), foreign companies 
contribute to the revitalization of the Japanese economy and, in a break with the past, the 
government is now actively promoting inward direct investment. The impact of FDI on the 






                                                 
159 FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP were still only 2.1 percent in 2004, compared with 12.6 percent in the 
United States, 12.9 percent in Germany, 26.5 percent in France, and 36.3 percent in Britain. Source: UNCTAD 
(2005). 
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  48Table 1: Employment in foreign affiliates as a share of total employment (in %) 
 
























  Total all sectors   n.a. 1.15 2.75 5.61
   Manufacturing total  1.36 1.94 5.91  10.78
03  Food products  0.29 0.34 1.32  8.38
04  Textiles & apparel  0.15 0.17 0.93  5.83
05  Wood and paper products  0.06 0.16 0.83  4.95
06  Publishing & printing  0.13 0.22 0.38  7.83
07  Chemical products  3.61 3.27 13.50  21.80
08  Drugs & medicine  7.21 15.49 15.27  31.90
09  Petroleum and coal products  7.24 2.91 2.31  22.20
10  Plastic products  0.41 0.45 3.22  10.03
11  Rubber products  1.08 1.15 2.81  40.18
12  Ceramic, stone and clay  0.28 0.35 1.55  21.45
13  Iron & steel  0.01 0.13 0.27  19.35
14  Non-ferrous metals  1.61 0.44 7.72  15.73
15  Metal products  0.31 0.20 0.72  7.52
16  General machinery  1.68 1.78 6.82  12.75
17  Electrical machinery  2.46 2.48 12.51  13.78
18  Motor vehicles & parts  4.72 10.79 18.32  15.60
19  Miscellaneous transport equipment  0.7 0.62 12.71  4.23
20  Precision instruments  0.41 0.90 5.04  11.16
21  Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.47 0.72 1.71  6.62
   Services total  0.65 0.97 2.04  4.31
22  Construction & civil engineering  0.05 0.05 0.30  1.72
23  Electricity, gas, steam and water supply, etc.  0.00 0.00 0.04  1.96
24  Wholesale trade  2.31 2.57 4.24  7.89
25  Retail trade  0.29 0.49 0.77  4.50
26  Financial intermediary services  1.47 1.75 10.00  6.10
27  Insurance  1.67 6.69 12.57  6.40
28  Real estate  0.02 0.08 0.28  1.64
29  Transportation & postal service  0.50 0.27 3.52  4.82
30  Telecommunications & broadcasting  0.22 2.31 6.55  7.66
31  Education & research institutes  0.34 0.97 1.76  6.39
32  Medical services, health and hygiene  0.02 0.04 0.16  1.99
33  Computer programming & information services 1.83 2.55 4.33  3.88
34  Goods & equipment rental & leasing  0.88 1.20 0.49  3.66
35  Other business services  0.52 1.71 2.10  4.77
36  Eating & drinking places  1.58 2.36 3.89  2.48
37  Other personal services  0.12 0.39 0.38  4.23
38  Other services  0.01 0.00 0.00 n.a.
Sources: Compiled from micro-data of METI’s Establishment and Enterprise Census for 1996 and 2001 and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Establishment Data for 1997, 
online: http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#FDIUS.  
 
Notes:  JAFF (33.4%): Japanese Affiliates of Foreign Firms (33.4% or more foreign-owned, one or more foreign 
companies); JAFF (20%): Japanese Affiliates of Foreign Firms (20% or more foreign-owned by a single foreign 
company); USAFF: U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Firms (10% or more foreign-owned by a single foreign company).  






Hino (Toyota: 50.5%)  Hino (Toyota: 50.1%) 




Nissan Nissan  (Renault:  44.3%) 
Nissan Diesel   Nissan Diesel (Nissan: 23.8%; Renault: 17.8%) 
  
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi  (Daimler:  18.8%) 
 
Mitsubishi Fuso (Daimler Chrysler: 85%; Mitsubishi 
group companies: 15%) 
  
Suzuki (GM: 3.3%)  Suzuki (GM: 20.0%) 
  
Fuji Heavy (Subaru) (Nissan: 4.2%)  Fuji Heavy (Subaru) (GM: 20.0%) 
  
Isuzu (GM: 37.5%)  Isuzu (GM: 11.9%) 
  
Mazda (Ford: 24.5%)  Mazda (Ford: 33.4%) 
Source: Compiled by authors from Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, Japan Company Handbook, and company websites.  
 
 
Table 3: Bankruptcies and acquisitions in the Japanese insurance industries 
 
Company   Year 
collapsed 
Buyer    Country of buyer  Year bought
Nissan Mutual
1)     1997  Artemis   France    1999 
Heiwa Life
2)  ---  Aetna  (ING)
 4) U.S.A. (Netherlands)    1999 
Toho Mutual     1999  GE Capital 
5) U.S.A.   2000 
Nihon Dantai Life
2)  ---  AXA    France    2000 
Nicos Life
2)  ---  Winterthur  Group  Switzerland    2000 
Daihyaku Mutual     2000  Manulife   Canada    2001 
Daiichi Mutual Fire & Marine
3)     2000  ---  ---    --- 
Orico Life
2)  ---  Prudential    U.K.    2001 
Taisho Life     2000  Yamato Life   Japan    2001 
Chiyoda Mutual     2000  AIG   U.S.A.    2001 
Kyoei Life     2000  Prudential Financial  U.S.A.    2001 
Tokyo Mutual     2000  T&D Financial   Japan    2001 
Taisei Fire and Marine     2001  Sompo Japan   Japan    2002 
Sources: Various press reports.  
Notes: 1) Following Nissan Mutual’s collapse, the company’s life insurance business was transferred to Aoba,  
  which is the name of the entity that Artemis bought. Aoba was subsequently sold on in 2004 to  
  Prudential.   
            2) Did not collapse. 
            3) No buyer was found. 
            4) Aetna, an American subsidiary of the Dutch financial services company ING, subsequently sold  
  Heiwa Life to MassMutual of the United States.  
            5) GE Capital’s Japanese life insurance business was subsequently bought by AIG in 2003.  
  50Table 4: The top 20 pharmaceutical companies by sales in Japan  
 






1  Takeda    Japan 3.6  6.3  15  
2  Pfizer    U.S.A. 3.4  5.8    1   
3   Roche    Switzerland 2.4  4.2  12  
4  Otsuka    Japan 2.4  4.1  24  
5  Sankyo    Japan 2.2  3.8  28  
6  Novartis  Switzerland 2.1  3.7    7   
7  Eisai    Japan 2.0  3.4  19  
8  Daiichi    Japan 1.9  3.3  N.A.  
9  Yamanouchi Seiyaku  Japan 1.6  2.8  23  
10  Merck & Co.  U.S.A. 1.6  2.7    5   
11  Mitsubishi Pharma  Japan 1.5  2.7  38  
12  Shionogi Seiyaku  Japan 1.4  2.5  39  
13  AstraZeneca   U.K. 1.3  2.3    6   
14  GlaxoSmithKline  U.K. 1.3  2.3    2   
15  Fujisawa  Japan 1.2  2.2  27  
16  Tanabe Seiyaku  Japan 1.2  2.1  50  
17  Sanofi-Aventis  France 1.2  2.1    3   
18  Ono  Japan 1.2  2.1  48  
19  Sumitomo  Japan 1.1  1.9  N.A.  
20  Kowa Shinyaku  Japan 1.0  1.7  N.A.  






Table 5: Acquisitions of Japanese pharmaceutical firms by foreigners 
Date   Companies involved 
1996.03  BASF (Germany) acquired controlling stake in Hokuriku Seiyaku. 
1999.04  Akzo Nobel (Netherlands) acquired the pharmaceutical division of Kanebo. 
2000.01  UCB (Belgium) acquired the pharmaceutical division (prescription drugs) of Fujirebio 
2000.01  Boehringer Ingelheim (Germany) announced a takeover bid for SS Pharmaceutical. SSP became 
a subsidiary in October 2001. 
2001.01  Schering (Germany) acquisition of Mitsui Pharmaceutical Industrial. 
2001.03  Abbott Laboratories (U.S.) acquired the pharmaceutical unit of BASF (Germany) and turned 
BASF-owned Hokuriku Seiyaku into a subsidiary. 
2002.10  Nippon Roche merged with Chugai Pharmaceutical. 
Source: JETRO, “Biotechnology”, online: <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/market/attract/biotechnology/key.html> 
(accessed 8 December, 2005), and press reports. 
 
 
Table 6: Possibility of private corporate participation in medical services 


























services  Corporate participation allowed 
Source: JETRO, Japan Economic Monthly, July 2005. 
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